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PREFACE 
 
 
Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the two shall meet,  
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat; 
     -R.Kipling 
 
 
Albeit the above poem, and its popular interpretation that East and West are 
incompatible by principle, this work reflects my belief that it is possible to make 
relevant comparisons between philosophies, in spite of their different temporal 
or cultural domain. My aim is to show that there are captivating similarities 
between Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi, when it comes to their 
understanding of One and The Many. I believe this kind of comparison to be 
possible only through thorough understanding of their cultural differences and 
what role these play in their respective philosophies. I would consider straight-
forward comparison between these philosophies, without consideration given to 
their respective domain, to be misguided. 
 
This should not be taken as a criticism towards any preceding scholars, working 
in the field of comparative philosophy, but as sincere respect for the difficulties 
I have met when trying to make apprehensible and meaningful comparison 
between philosophies of different cultural backgrounds. On the true 
understanding of the hardships of comparative philosophy, I have found great 
help in the work of professor G.E.R Lloyd, who in my opinion has done a great 
effort in trying to bring forth understanding of the differences between Greek 
and Chinese Philosophies.  
 
What in the first place caught my imagination, was the use of element-theories 
in both cultures. But the more I was looking into the subject, the less convinced 
I was that the common ground for philosophical thought should be found there. 
This was for many reasons, but I came to think that these philosophers were 
after so much more than just to find the pattern in which change occurs. So I 
went on to see what they had to say about change itself. This proved to be 
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somewhat more fruitful approach, but it suffered from the fact that the Chinese 
had no problem with change, but their question was how should one 
accommodate to it. This at least in Lao Zi’s case, for his background was 
thoroughly influenced by Yi Jing (The Book of Changes), which takes ongoing 
change to be the only constant thing in the world. 
 
Change is elemental when we are trying to make sense of the Greek thinkers of 
this paper. On the surface of it, Heraclitus is regarded as holding the opinion that 
change is constant (and hence there can not be knowledge as Plato had it in 
Theaitetos), and Parmenides is of the opinion that change is an illusion of 
‘mortals’ (i.e. the common man). While these descriptions hit partially the mark, 
they can not be said to outline the work of these two men. We will see that the 
focus of their work was considerably more challenging and in significant 
amounts less technical than that. 
 
So when I was considering what could serve as a common-ground for all these 
thinkers, I ended with one conclusion; they were all after the Wisdom which 
would reveal The Most Fundamental Reality for us. All these philosophers 
claim to have some sort of understanding which differs qualitatively from that of  
a ‘common man’. All of them regard this journey to take place inside man 
himself or that this journey has revealed them the true arranging of things. This 
symbolism should not go unnoticed. 
 
This concentration on change seems too vast to capture anything interesting or 
shared between these philosophers, and therefore I chose to concentrate on the 
question of The One and The Many, although none of them were using this 
exact wording. So the key-questions which all of these philosophers will have to 
answer are; What is change and is it real? The world seems to consist of plural 
entities, what kind of unity bonds it? What is wisdom? What is the world really 
like, what is reality like in its most fundamental level? 
 
So in my methodology I shall concentrate on more classical notions of Wisdom 
and The most Fundamental Reality, and on lesser extent to the gross details of 
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Heraclitus’, Parmenides’ and Lao Zi’s thought. Only the outcome of this paper 
will reveal if my chosen methodology stands correct. 
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GENERAL CULTURAL DIFFERENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
This chapter is dedicated to give some general outlines of the two different 
cultures and some of the features which have influenced the ways of making 
philosophy. Since Heraclitus and Parmenides were under the influence of Greek 
culture and Lao Zi of Chinese, broadly speaking, I will represent some of the 
outlines of these two cultures. It is of course a quite a generalisation to call these 
philosophers Chinese or Greek, since both cultures have been brought under the 
topic ‘Greek’ or ‘Chinese’ by scholars in later times. These questions should not 
be too troublesome, since the aim of this paper is to make comparisons between 
philosophers, not between different cultures. 
 
So while the cultural influences are not the focus of this paper, they should be 
addressed nevertheless. The impact they have had on these philosophers and 
especially on their modus, is significant. In this chapter I mainly refer to the 
work of G.E.R. Lloyd. His work has been the most comprehensive I have run 
into, in fact he is the key-figure in my opinion alongside with professor Sivin, in 
all the work concerning the comparing of Chinese and Greek cultures. His books 
cover a wide range of topics in these two cultures, from comparing astrology to 
comparing military technology. His work also helps one to understand the 
implicit reasons why these two traditions differ from one another in the way of 
persuasion and the goal of philosophizing. 
 
 
From things to lookout.. 
 
There are two points that we should take into consideration before we start to 
make comparisons between philosophies of two different domains, they are 
called An Anti-generalisation point and An Anti-piecemeal point.1 These two 
reflects two grievous mistakes that a scholar might do. In Anti-generalisation 
point, Lloyd wishes to remind us that we shouldn’t drive towards generalisations 
                                               
1 Lloyd, 1996, p.3 
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about the whole culture. These two cultures, namely The Greek and The 
Chinese, are way too vast to be grouped under few descriptions that would 
explain the whole of them and the intellectuals they produced. Lloyd wishes to 
make no point of overall mentality of Greek or Chinese thought, he sees this as a 
an over-generalisation, it is a mistake to make an assumption that there is such a 
uniformity in thinking. Thinking differs from time to time, even inside one 
culture2. As he states: “..all the diversity tends to get set aside all too readily 
when the grand generalisation about Greek thought is attempted.”3 
 
Even though Lloyd presents no overall schema of Greek or Chinese thought, he 
nevertheless sheds some light into their general differences by distinguishing 
their historical background. And even if in this work I am trying to avoid the 
grand generalisations, I nevertheless wish to have general outlines of the two 
cultures in question. It is not that philosophers in question were acting in a 
vacuum of values while working in their philosophy, nor do I wish to make it an 
assessment that they were merely the products of their respective cultures. 
 
The second point that Lloyd wishes to make is Anti-piecemeal Point. This is a 
real challenge to the study in question, for I try to follow most of the guidelines 
that Lloyd puts forward, but at the end of this chapter (and work) I shall also 
take a glimpse at the gaps found in Lloyd’s method. The Anti-Piecemeal Point 
goes in the lines that we shouldn’t compare theories and concepts between 
different cultures straightforwardly, with the assumptions that they are talking 
about the same thing. 
 
First this sort of mistake to come into mind, would be that of comparing Dao 
and Logos straightforwardly. Dao and Logos are very vast concepts, even 
among their respective cultures. A common tradition of philosophers is to re-
define the concepts and it could be seen as essential to understanding a 
particular philosophy, to get a grip of the sense that the philosopher is using the 
word in. So in this work I shall refer to these terms, Dao and Logos, only 
regarding their place in the thinking of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi.  
                                               
2 Lloyd, 1996, p.3-4 
3 Lloyd, 1996, p.4 
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What is the left of the project that we are about to set forth? If we cannot make 
definitive generalisations about the culture and neither can we compare concepts 
of different cultural domain, what is there to do in comparative philosophy? I’ll 
start with Lloyd’s view how we should conduct this investigation and after that 
set my own agenda forth for assessment. In short, I use the concepts on ‘The 
One’, ‘The Many’ and ‘Change’ as focal points. 
 
 
…To things to look into  
 
The first of the methodological principle that Lloyd puts forward is, that we 
shouldn’t compare the answers that the individuals gave, but those questions 
that the individuals were asking (and whether their answers were suitable for 
those questions)4. “What were the questions or problems that the Chinese were 
concerned with that led to the answers they gave being the answers they were? 
And what, similarly, were the key questions or problems on the Greek side?”5  
 
Secondly, we are reminded by Lloyd that we shouldn’t separate the content of 
philosophical debate from its mode of conduct6. These differences in the ways of 
making philosophy and the cultural differences, have a major impact on 
philosophy of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. So while Lloyd’s Anti-
generalisation point, is of little concern to us, since we are not trying to make 
point about a whole of Chinese or Greek philosophy, his second Anti-piecemeal 
point, deserves our full attention. In the following I’m bringing out the features 
of these two cultures that have had their influence on the mode of conduct, or the 
way of doing philosophy.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Lloyd, 1996, p.9 
5 Lloyd, 1996, p.9 
6 Lloyd,1996, p.18 
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The way philosophy was done.. 
 
Despite the Anti-generalisation point, Lloyd characterizes the Chinese culture as 
Irenic and the Greek culture to be Antagonistic7. These are not definitive, they 
are even close to being trivial, but in favour of Lloyd, these concepts work 
rather well when comparing Chinese and Greek surroundings for philosophy.  
 
In China, the school of a certain philosophy, or philosopher to be more exact, 
was called jia, which as a written character stands also for a family or sect. The 
function of the jia was to uphold and spread the Master’s teachings8. The one of 
the characteristics that differs from the Greeks, is that obedience was held in a 
very high esteem, which can also be understood by the word jia, family, sect. 
Master of the school, often already passed away, was the authority of the school 
in question, and to criticize him directly and openly, was not a custom. On the 
other hand, a student might have several schools of thought which he 
attended.9However, it was commonplace to criticize other philosophical 
schools10.  
 
In Greek we can find some contrast to this. The schools were relatively more 
open, to the limit that you could talk of inquiring communities11. It was a 
custom for a person to change a school of thought quite often12 and criticising 
teacher, or master if you will, was a genuine possibility13. 
Also influence was gained from variety of schools and these influences were 
later brought up by saying that the philosopher in question was a ‘student of 
Heraclitus’, when he actually had Heraclitean tendencies. 
 
 
 
                                               
7 Lloyd, Adversaries and authorities: investigations into ancient Greek and Chinese science, 
1996 
8 Lloyd, 1996, p.32  
9 Lloyd, 1996, p.34 
10 Lloyd, 1996, p.41 
11 Lloyd, 1996, p.38 
12 Ibid., p.37 
13 Ibid., 1996, p. 35 
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..To whom it was directed 
 
It goes without saying that the audience in question has a big effect on the way 
philosophy is done. The modes of conduct and different forums influence 
heavily the modus of philosophising. 
 
In the case of the Greeks, philosophy was directed towards the intellectuals, 
which in the Greeks case equals to aristocrat-elite of city-states. It was also 
common to give public lectures and hold open debates between different 
schools14. It also stands that the ways of conduct in these sessions resembled 
very much the customs held in public meetings and public trials15. The study of 
the impact that these forums gave to the mode of conduct and the way of 
reasoning are a subject of a study on their own, but for the study in hands, it’s 
sufficient to say that argumentative reasoning was later to become a field on its 
own right. 
 
In China philosophy was directed to the emperor himself, at least formally16. 
Also to the shi, the literati that was emperors governmental-aid. Probably wide 
support among the literati could ease the way to the emperor’s favour, but the 
fact remains that the public addressee of the philosophy was ruler17.  
 
These differences in whom the philosophy was addressed to, should not be 
exaggerated. For the philosophers in question, Heraclitus and Parmenides did 
not write to the emperor, whereas Lao Zi partially did. In both cultures the 
literati was in essential role in evaluating these thoughts. 
 
Especially Lao Zi’s  Dao De Jing has been traditionally divided into two parts, 
the De and the Dao. Whereas the De is more concerned about the governmental 
issues, the Dao is at greater extent directed to the individuals in literati. At the 
Lao Zi-chapter I give some facts which could hinder that the concept of De 
                                               
14 Ibid., 1996, p.39 
15 Ibid., A&A, p.86 and p.79 [eri kirja?] 
16 Ibid., A&A, p.39 
17 Lloyd, 1996, p.41 
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gained popularity in later additions to Dao De Jing, and for this reason De 
gained its place alongside Dao. 
 
 
Ways of Persuasion and Argumentation 
 
What influences did the differences in sects and in the audience of philosophy 
have on the way of persuasion and argumentation? And how it can be seen in 
the argumentation and general structure of the reasoning in the case of 
Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi? I will briefly go over the features that 
characterizes the Greek philosophy and the Chinese, but none of the 
philosophers in concern gave any systematic proof of their ideas. They were 
implicitly giving away what we might be regarded as ‘proof’, or as persuasion. 
Parmenides stands as the one who tries to give some arguments for his views, 
but all these are pretty inconclusive.  
 
The Chinese mathematics was fairly acquainted with the need for 
generalisations18, but the culture as a whole is rich with the use of analogies19. In 
the times of Lao Zi, there were nothing resembling axiomatic proof20, but there 
was recognition of bian, to be argumentative21. In addition to Lloyd’s stand, I 
would say that there are some examples of analogies, reasoning and 
argumentation in Lao Zi’s book, but the text itself trusts that the reader will find 
the proofs himself, in this sense the reasoning might be called implicit. But one 
feature that sets Lao Zi apart from his colleagues in Greece is the use of the 
ideal of a Wise Man, the Sage. While Heraclitus, and to some extent 
Parmenides, do talk about importance of wisdom as a goal and at the same time 
tell what is the content of being wise (i.e. what does the Wise Man believe in), it 
is Lao Zi who gives the ideal its central place as mediator between Dao and 
man. Since Dao is sort of omni-principle, it stands too far to be recognized as an 
ideal for conduct, so the Sage acts as a more approachable figure in Dao De 
Jing. Also it is a fact that it was a custom in China to portrait oneself as a Wise 
                                               
18 Lloyd, 1996 p.61 
19 Ibid., p.75-76 
20 Ibid., p.75 
21 Ibid., p.34 
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Man22, and thus way to further ones agenda. I have more to say about the subject 
in the Lao Zi-chapter of the work. 
 
Heraclitus and Parmenides are trying to convince their audience that they have 
wisdom which surpasses the understanding of a common man. To Heraclitus 
wisdom lies in the fact that man is capable of recognizing Logos23 in the world, 
while Parmenides claims his vision to be based on divine inspiration which has 
moved him beyond everyday understanding. Also, Parmenides does not hold 
back his criticism when it comes to the errors of common man, set against the 
Wise.  
 
 
Elements with Politics 
 
Both the Chinese and the Greek culture have used elements to describe and to 
organize the pattern of change. Chinese have the yin-yang where yin stands for 
dark and feminine, and yang for bright and masculine, and the change is 
explicable using these terms. When it comes to Heraclitus, we see that 
Heraclitus is also using his elementary theory to describe change and its 
occurrence and pattern; all changes start from fire, become earth and then sea 
(water), after which the change is reversed. For Parmenides, to see the world 
governed by two principles or elements is the way of common people, or his 
predecessors, to make sense to the pattern in change. For Parmenides this way of 
sorting experience is not reliable. 
 
When looking at Greece, we find traces of two ideas that are related to elements. 
First of these ideas is, that there is substance or substances that have existed 
always. For example Thales sees that the element of water is substantial and 
Anaximander held the opinion that the key-element in understanding the world 
is apeiron, boundless or limitless. The second idea is that complicated things are 
                                               
22 Ibid., p.92 
23 Logos in this case could stand for sense. Other meanings for Logos, see the Heraclitus-chapter. 
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made of simpler elements, which in turn are not made up of another kind of 
elements24.  
 
We should now remind ourselves how Lloyd sketched the difference between 
mentality of philosophical or scientific communities In Greece and China. He 
characterized the Chinese mentality as irenic and authority-bound25 and the 
Greek mentality as one encouraging adversiality. This is one of his key-points 
and he goes on in quite some length to give credibility to his point. In my view 
his point in general is correct.  
  
Lloyd sees that the sphere of cosmological thought can not be separated from 
the political sphere: ”Several of the Presocratic philosophers already pictured 
the cosmos as a political state, even though they diverged on the type of state in 
question. Some, such as Anaximander (-6th century), saw it in terms of balance 
of opposed equal powers – and Empedocles represented the relations between 
his equal cosmic principles as being governed by ‘broad oath’, that is, a kind of 
contract between them. But others (Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle) 
saw the cosmos as a monarchy, under a single divine ruler: while Heraclitus saw 
the world in terms of strife or anarchy.”26. The last remark on Heraclitus should 
be reconsidered, as I will try to show. But the cosmological and the political 
sphere do have common features, but is it that the cosmological sphere reflects 
the political one or vice versa? I will come back to these thoughts at the end of 
the chapter and at the conclusions-part of my work, but generally I agree with 
Lloyd that the two spheres are strongly intertwined. 
 
How about the China? Can we see similarities in preferences in the political 
thought and the cosmological one? We should take a glimpse in the culture in 
which the Chinese philosophers operated. It was briefly noted that the Chinese 
philosophers addressed their work to the Emperor, but the relationship was a bit 
deeper than that. The literati and the emperor had a relationship that was 
mutually beneficial; the literati legitimated the Emperors position and in return, 
                                               
24 Lloyd, 1970, p.40 
25 Lloyd, 1996, p.44 
26 Lloyd, 1996, p.101 
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the Emperor provided support for the literati27. It should also be mentioned that 
the literati held the official posts in imperial court. So we could say that there 
was a case of mutual benefit; literati gained a way to power and the Emperor 
gained influence among the ruling class. Besides this crucial point of mutual 
support, we should also take a notice of a concept of tianrenheyi, which is 
elemental to our understanding of the cultural and metaphysical currents in Lao 
Zi’s time. The translation for tianrenheyi is a problematic one but tian stands for 
Heaven, ren for Man, he for bother, and yi for one or oneness. Of the influences 
that can be seen in Lao Zi’s De Dao Jing, perhaps the most important is the Yi 
Jing (Book of Changes), and this book:”...reflects the philosophical 
understanding of the unity of multiplicity, namely, tian ren he yi. In this unitary 
oneness, wherein the universe and man are identically merged, there lies a 
harmonious interrelation and interaction between the cosmological world and 
the human world.”28. Linyu Gu, the writer of previous quote, expresses the idea 
of tianrenheyi as The Harmonius Oneness of The Universe and Man. 
Tianrenheyi illustrates quite nicely what Lloyd proposes; that the Chinese 
culture values irenic vices. One of the Lloyd’s points is that the Chinese 
elementary-theories, namely yin-yang in our case, cannot be straightforwardly 
compared to Greek elementary-theories, for they reflect different kinds of 
political environments. 
 
We could then conclude that due to the fact that the yin-yang-theory reflects the 
reciprocity between the ruler and those who are ruled, it can not be compared 
too hastily to Greek theories of elements. The Greek counterparts reflect a wider 
variety of political systems, which often had an implicit supposition of one 
element being of a higher status29. I slightly disagree with Lloyd on this broad 
generalisation, which is excusable in terms of it really being a broad 
generalisation. I see the influence in Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi, of their 
respective cultures but I wouldn’t go so far as to say that there couldn’t be a 
sensible comparison between them on the subject of change and that of One and 
                                               
27 Ibid., p.126 
28 Linyu Gu: ”Tian Ren He Yi (The Harmonius Oneness of The Universe and Man): A review of 
Steven Heine’s Opening a Mountain – Kôan of the Zen Masters, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 
2006, p.177 
29 Lloyd, 1996, p.136-138 
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The Many. Actually, this is one of my main assertions and I believe that my 
study gives credibility to my view. 
 
It would be rather harsh to say that the philosophers in concern, namely 
Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi, did not have any personal impact on the 
philosophy that they were making, but that their philosophy was a product of 
their particular society, especially when Heraclitus gives Logos a new sense, 
whereas Lao Zi gives new sense to Dao. Even though it is clear that the political 
sphere had a considerable influence on philosophical thought, it is also that the 
thought relating to philosophy and wisdom had an impact on that very same 
political sphere. The idea that political sphere stands somehow intact, from 
where we can understand the whole content of philosophy, strikes to me as 
unsound. 
 
 
Conclusions on the Cultural Differences 
 
To bring together the ideas of this chapter, I would conclude that Lloyd is right 
in the point that the two traditions differ quite considerably in their ways of 
persuasion and in the settings in which the philosophers worked. But maybe not 
so much in their basic questions that we would have to condemn it an 
impossibility to make comparisons between philosophical inquiries in two 
different cultures. It was Lloyd himself that pointed out that we shouldn’t look 
into the answers that the philosophers gave, but the questions they were asking. 
And in my opinion, each one of the subject of this paper were trying to answer 
the following-like questions, and these are the questions I’m asking from each 
one. What is change? Why and how it occurs? Is change real? What is the place 
of change in human experience? What is the goal of human wisdom in a world 
that seems to change constantly? What kind of Unity is there under the world of 
seemingly plural entities? What is common and shared by all that is? 
 
So while I in the next chapters concentrate on the question of Change, the reader 
should stay aware that my final goal is finding out what kind of monism and 
pluralism did the philosophers in concern promote 
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HERACLITUS 
 
 
In this chapter I shall concentrate on Logos and the place of change in 
Heraclitus’ thought and only touch briefly on the concept of elementary theory, 
due to the fact that none of the interpretations about this subject is entirely 
coherent. This is not to be taken as a criticism towards modern scholars working 
on Heraclitus, but as a sincere remark of the difficulties any hard-working 
scholar is ready to admit on this area of Heraclitus’ thought. In my opinion 
Heraclitus’ theory and view on change do provide some interesting, 
philosophical considerations. In the core of Heraclitus’ thought lies one 
interesting concept, that of Logos, and a highly defined view of the place of 
change in the world. 
 
I should note that I disagree with the assumption that the content of Heraclitus’ 
Logos could be reduced to the mere elementary theory. This approach is way too 
technical and misses many of the Heraclitus’ finer philosophical remarks.  
 
This chapter should give evidence to my view on Heraclitus’ thought. I’m going 
to defend the following claims: 1) Logos is Heraclitus’ way of offering a path to 
finding Unity in the changing world of Many. His monism is a kind of epistemic 
monism in ontological plurality. Of course ‘monism’ and ‘pluralism’ are 
concepts that did not exist at Heraclitus’ time, but they are nevertheless quite 
suitable to describe his philosophy. 2) Logos can not be reduced to the mere 
pattern in change, i.e. the element theory. The content of Logos is far wider than 
that. 
 
These goals do not contradict the broad variety of modern interpretation on 
Heraclitus, but neither are they self-evident. The questions which I think are the 
key to understanding Heraclitus’ thought are the following: There is plurality, 
but what kind of unity is there in the world? There seems to be regularities in the 
changes that take place in the world, what are these and why are there such? I 
will try to find out what are Heraclitus’ answers to these questions. 
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Logos 
 
Heraclitus was not the first to dwell in the problem of change and constancy in 
our world. He inherited some of the concepts from earlier thinkers, but his 
rigorous focus on change and its nature, had a deep influence on the thinkers to 
follow30. 
 
As an example of the influence of earlier thinkers on Heraclitus, is the concept 
that the kosmos is in a state of constant war between elementary opposites, 
which can be traced back to Anaximander. Unlike Anaximander, Heraclitus 
however, did not consider this to be wrong, but sees it as a normal state of 
events, something that is to be accepted as Status quo31. We will see that this 
tension is actually pivotal to the world-order. 
 
Much can be said about the style of Heraclitus’ work. It is intriguing and there 
one can feel the sense of something of a mystical quality. But for this work it is 
sufficient to say that it resembles the style of oracles and Wise Men32. Much 
more fascinating interpretation of stylistic choice of Heraclitus and the reasons 
behind it can be found in Graham’s work33. Graham says that Heraclitus’ 
syntactic ambiguity is intentional and I agree with that, but I see Heraclitus’ 
choice of style as more of suggestive, it calls the reader to ponder the things 
himself. In this sense the style itself carries important philosophical feature 
which can not be cut separate from his philosophical considerations. 
 
The sense one gets in reading modern commentaries on Heraclitus, is the 
quintessential role that the majority of them give to logos in interpreting the 
remaining fragments. Although we do not know how much the fragments have 
altered during the centuries to follow or what was said in the material that did 
not survive to our days, it can be said that Heraclitus gave a special sense to 
                                               
30 Parmenides probably refers critically to his ideas on change in his work. See more, Coxon, 
p.18 and p.186-189  
31 Guthrie, p.197-198,  “Flux and Logos in Heraclitus”, The pre-Socratics, 1996 
32 Kahn, 1979, p.7 
33 Daniel W.Graham: “Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge”, The Oxford Handbook of 
Presocratic Philosophy  
 
 18
logos and used it in a very specific manner. For our purposes the following 
connotations are central; Logos can be said to refer to “what is said”, word, 
story, mathematical ratio, right reckoning, reasonable proportion34. 
 
But for us there is a special interest in Heraclitus’ original way of using this 
word; that as logos  
1) describing the underlying unity of the world and 2) as a principle governing 
the change. 
 
”Of this logos which is always people prove to have no understanding, both 
before they hear [of?] it and when once they have heard it. For though all things 
come about according to this logos, (people) are as though they had no 
experience, though they experience such words and deeds as I set forth, marking 
off each thing according to its nature and pointing out how it is. But other 
people do not notice what they do when awake – just as they do not notice all 
the things they forget about when sleep.”35 (DK.1) 
 
Catherine Osborne remarks that this fragment gives two meanings to Logos, first 
it is used in a sense 1) That all things take place in accordance with it, and 2) it 
is also something people hear, and yet fail to appreciate even when they have 
heard it36.It can be added that Heraclitus does not consider peoples fallacy to be 
due to world’s constant change, but that of people’s inability to grasp the 
underlying message, the Logos37. 
 
So why is it that the common people are unable to catch this message, this logos. 
For Heraclitus himself it had to do with the very nature of this logos, for he says 
the following: 
 
                                               
34 Hussey, p.91, “Heraclitus”, The Cambridge Companion to early Greek Philosophy 
 
35 The translation is Hussey’s, 1999, p.92 
36 Osborne,1997, p.97,“Heraclitus”, Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume 1, From the 
Beginning to Plato 
37 Graham, 2008, p.176 
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”Latent structure (harmoniê) is master of visible structure”38. (DK.54)  
 
Here we can see that for Heraclitus the fundamental structure is not evident from 
the visible events. So in a world of constant change there is a latent and 
profound structure and a right use of reason will reveal this structure to us39. 
 
Heraclitus strongly believes that people should pursue a right kind of reasoning, 
and that the results of doing so, would bring forth the universal rule that governs 
the world. If people are not using their rationality right, the results of their 
queries will not be truly universal and applicable to all. 
 
“Though the logos is shared, the many live as though they had a private source 
of understanding”40 
 
For Heraclitus this is a grievous mistake. Nothing at all shall be achieved by 
relying to private opinions, they lead people astray. There should be a genuine 
way of reasoning (Logos) that would reveal the true structure of the world (also 
Logos)41. The way of reasoning should be common to all. 
 
”Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, 
as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the laws of  
men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it  
wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over.”42 (DK.114) 
 
Way of reasoning and its results can not be accepted to be varying from 
individual to another, but must reflect the universal rule that all things come 
according to. Heraclitus is really advocating the idea, that as well as the way of 
reasoning is common to all, so are the results that are gained through such an 
                                               
38 Hussey, 1999, p.91 
39 Ibid, p.93 
40 Hussey, 1999, p.92 
41 This double-meaning of “logos” might seem difficult, but Heraclitus makes it obvious in which sense he 
is using the word on this occasion 
42 Kirk, p.48 
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understanding; the way that the world functions43. He does not ask us to believe 
just his word: 
 
“When one listens, not to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree (homologein) 
that all things are one [hen panta].”44 (DK.50) 
 
So we should summarize what is Heraclitus’ Logos like. Some have suggested 
that it is at the same time the discourse of Heraclitus, the nature of language 
itself, the structure of the psyche and the universal principle in accordance with 
which all things come to pass45. In my view, the most important aspect of Logos 
is the one that describes Logos as a rule or a law, by which all things come to 
pass. Therefore, Logos can be seen as the rule governing the constant change46. 
In here, lies a striking resemblance to modern concept of laws of nature. While 
there is certainly a huge gap between the two concepts, and I do not wish to 
make the mistake of interpreting Heraclitus’ thought only through the concept of 
‘pre-scientist’, I see this as a very essential feature of Heraclitus’ thought.  
 
Another feature of Logos that is important, is the concept of hen panta that 
Heraclitus presents in his fragments: ”It is wise, listening not to me but to the 
report [Logos], to agree that all things are one.”47 (DK.50) and “…: out of all 
things can be made a unity, and out of a unity, all things.”48(DK.10). This hen 
panta reflects the Unity Heraclitus is after. 
 
It is no new conception that Heraclitus was trying to bridge monism and 
pluralism in his work, for even Plato hold this opinion. But how is Heraclitus to 
overcome the difficulties that one faces when trying to bridge monism and 
pluralism? His answer is, according to Kirk49, that we should stress more the 
synthetic view to things, instead of the conventional analytic thinking, since 
synthetic view reveals the underlying unity. Kirk takes the following to say what 
                                               
43 Kahn, p.21-22 
44 Hussey, 1999, p.91 
45 Kahn, p.21-22 
46 Osborne, p.100 
47 Kahn, p.45 
48 Kirk, p.168 
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is Heraclitus’ point: ” ‘from all things (i.e. the plural phenomenal world) one can 
understand a unifying connection; from this connexion, the single formula or 
Logos of all things, one is led to turn one’s attention back to the many things 
which are so connected.’ ”50 Here we can already see what I described as 
Heraclitus’ ontological pluralism and epistemological monism, the Unity stands 
above the Many. 
 
Heraclitus’ philosophy is incomprehensible if we do not keep in mind that he 
held the idea that all change in the kosmos come to be because of the elementary 
battle of opposite forces. This concept of kosmos as a battleground for these 
forces was briefly touched in the beginning, but in order to understand 
Heraclitus’ philosophy of change we must examine elements more thoroughly. 
 
 
Opposites and the Element Theory 
 
I already mentioned in the beginning that there is a huge variation in the 
interpretations of Heraclitus’ thinking when it comes to regarding the place and 
nature of opposite forces, and even greater variation when the topic is his 
elementary theory of change. So I will keep this part rather short, since it is not 
even in the focus of my current work to settle out these controversial issues. 
Instead, I focus on the place that change occupies in Heraclitus’ thought, rather 
than refining the technicalities of this issue, since there is no commonly 
accepted interpretation of it. 
 
In the last chapter we came to the conclusion that for Heraclitus it was more 
fundamental to see the underlying connection in the plurality of things, rather 
than just the pluralities. He stressed the Unity over The Many. This same 
stressing on unity of seemingly plural entities can also be seen in Heraclitus’ 
words on opposite elements.  
 
                                               
50 Kirk, p.178 
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“War is common because the Logos that is the law of all becoming is a law of 
strife, of simultaneous opposite tensions.”51(DK.80) 
 
Here the two concepts are intertwined; strife (change in world) is due to the fact 
that there is a fundamental tension between the opposites Without this built-in 
oppositionary nature of kosmos, there would be no change, as can be seen in 
Heraclitus’ fragment: 
 
 “Even the barley-drink disintegrates if it is not moved.”52(DK.125) 
 
The barley-drink was made out of barley, wine and melted cheese, and 
obviously such a drink would disintegrate, stagnate if not constantly stirred. 
What Heraclitus has in mind is that it is constitutive for our kosmos to be in 
constant change, without such a change, the world would be in a state of 
constant harmony (stagnation). 53  
 
But Heraclitus turns it around; it is not only that there are opposite forces in our 
kosmos, but that there is hidden unity where the opposite nature of these forces 
is seen as relative and much is emphasized that we should concentrate our 
efforts in seeing the underlying harmony.  
 
“They do not understand how being at variance with itself it agrees: back-
turning structure as of a bow or a lyre”54(DK.51) 
 
So while these forces oppose each other, they nevertheless form a greater 
harmony. As Daniel W. Graham puts it: ”They [opposites] are stages in a 
process of transition such that one goes from having one to having the other – 
and back again.”55 
 
                                               
51 Guthrie, p.198 
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When Heraclitus is describing his opposites in a kosmos level, it should be noted 
that this strife takes place also within particular objects56. This kind of change is 
elemental to the being of that object, thing or a person. Change concerns the 
very physis, nature of that being. I will return to this point. While it is true that it 
might be right to assert that for Heraclitus there was a greater cycle in a kosmos 
level57, it is also in Heraclitus interest to explain how and why individual beings 
and objects change. 
 
There has been two interpretations on the relationship between opposites; other 
one saying that opposites form a reciprocal tension between each other, the other 
interpretation saying that they are the ends of oscillation; that all things vary on 
this scale58. Wiggins on the other hand does not see big difference between these 
concepts, and even comes to the conclusion that these are co-existing views: 
”Heraclitus’ theory of the world requires reciprocal tension if it is to 
accommodate substance; and it requires oscillation if it is to accommodate 
periodicity.”59 
 
We are now ready to investigate the elemental theory of change in Heraclitus. 
As I noted previously, this is quite a controversial issue, but it does not need to 
blur the conclusion of this paper, since we are looking what is the place and 
nature of change in Heraclitus. In the following I shall refer mainly to Graham’s 
interpretation of elemental change. It might be said that in earlier interpretations 
of Heraclitus there was reserved a pivotal place for the element of fire and this 
view has some support.  
 
“This world-order (kosmos), the same of all, no god or man did create, but it 
ever was and will be: everliving fire, kindling in measures and being quenched 
in measures”60 (DK.30) 
                                               
56 Graham, p.175 
57 Kahn has been a proponent of this view that believes that Heraclitus thought that the whole 
world borns, dies and reborns in cycles. The name of the concept is ecpyrosis,  the great 
conflagration. 
58 The first view is held by Aristotle and Kirk, the second by Kahn 
59 Wiggins, p.20-21, “Heraclitus’ conception of flux, fire and material persistence”, Language 
and Logos: Studies in ancient Greece philosophy presented to G.E.L. Owen 
60 Graham, p.170, 
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On this fragment ‘Fire’ might not refer to one of the elements, but as a notion 
might be quite close to Logos61. In this fragment we can see the first hint of the 
possibility that changelessness (kosmos as sustaining world-order) and change 
(the image of constantly changing fire) are somehow intertwined. Fire could be 
chosen for this instance for its qualities; even though it seems to move without 
regularities, one can feel that it does have sense and rhythm of its own. 
Nevertheless there are clearer passages in Heraclitus that show the 
interchangebility of seemingly oppositionary elements. 
 
“To souls it is death to become water, to water death to become earth, but from 
earth water is born, and from water soul”62(DK.36) 
 
In interpreting this fragment it helps to know that soul is equated to the element 
of fire. So the elemental process goes from fire to water, from water to earth, 
and back to water from earth, and from water to fire. All these processes are 
reciprocal, it does not matter where one starts, it is always in this order that the 
change appears. Graham gives the following conclusion about the nature of 
elements: “.., the constant transformations of matter seem to maintain the overall 
stability of the totality.”63 I agree here with Graham’s interpretation, for it helps 
us to understand the notion that Heraclitus is probably best known for the later 
generations. This notion uses rivers to interlock the idea of change of matter and 
sustaining structures. 
 
 
The Role and Place of Change in Heraclitus 
 
Whatever we might make of Heraclitus’ concept of change, there is one concept 
that has been attributed to Heraclitus and that he is known for. It is scheme of 
panta rhei, everything changes. This is a thought that Plato says Heraclitus 
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62 Graham, p.172 
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proposed64 and it is the view that Heraclitus is best known for the later 
generations. It is quite questionable how right Plato’s view on Heraclitus was on 
this issue, for these philosophers had a different orientation in their work. 
Heraclitus was not an epistemologist but more keen to explain change and its 
nature, although he had some demands on what could be said to hold true. As 
we saw in the logos-chapter, he held that the way of rationalizing should be 
universal, and that the order of the change is not itself under change, but “..it 
ever was and will be.”.(DK.30) 
 
Some of the studies in last century held the opinion that this view of constant 
flux is not what Heraclitus himself promoted. On the other hand, more resent 
research has come to the conclusion that this view does exist in Heraclitus’ 
thought. Wiggins sees that there is really no problem in panta rhei, because 
there is sustainability in the changing world, this constancy is manifested in the 
law-likeness of the order of change65, i.e. as constant logos. So it goes well to 
say that for Plato Heraclitus was a figure that modelled an instable world that 
nothing can be known of66. 
 
So what was Heraclitus’ own idea of change and sustainability? For panta rhei 
itself appears in the fragments in slightly different way that it is discussed in the 
work of Plato. 
 
“As they step into the same rivers, other and still other waters flow upon 
them.”67 (DK.12) 
 
If Heraclitus was insisting that nothing is constant and everything is in a 
constant flux, why is he referring to same rivers? For surely they are not the 
same rivers if the waters in them have changed? He is not actually neglecting 
the sameness of the rivers, but takes it as given68. It is the constant renewal that 
makes the form of an entity to be lasting, as long as there is the renewal of the 
                                               
64 Plato: Cratylus: 402 
65 Wiggins, p.24 
66 Guthrie, p.201 
67 Kahn, p.53 
68 Kahn, p.167 
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‘filling’. Without the constant flow of water, there would be no river. Graham 
goes on to exemplify:  
”Heraclitus’s point is rather that different things (here: material components) 
can make up the same things (structures). Rivers, in fact, are long-lasting 
organizational states of transitory waters. The structure supervenes on the matter 
and outlasts it, attaining at least a relative permanence through it channelling of 
the ephemeral matter.”69I see that Graham’s account on this subject is coherent 
with the content of Heraclitus’ fragments. 
 
Heraclitus himself never said panta rhei, that everything changes, but that this is 
Plato’s interpretation of Heraclitus’ fr.12. Plato misses the point, for Heraclitus, 
permanency of structures (i.e. beings) is based on the constant change of their 
‘filling’.  
 
 
Conclusions on Heraclitus 
 
In the end, I would like to ask, what were the questions Heraclitus was asking 
and whether the answers he gave, can be said to answer those questions. 
Heraclitus naturally inherited some of the key interests and questions from 
earlier philosophers. A.A. Long gives a short account on what he sees as the 
modus of early Greek philosophy:"[to give] an account of all things that is (1) 
explanatory and systematic, (2) coherent and argumentative, (3) transformative, 
(4) educationally provocative, and (5) critical and unconventional”70. In Long's 
description, it was essentially in Pre-socratics interest to explain all things, that 
is the phenomena that take place in the world. 
  
What then distinguished Heraclitus as a philosopher from his contemporaries? 
Long says that Heraclitus gives as rational and systematic explanation as 
possible, he sees that his presentation is coherent, he wishes to wake people 
from their "private world" (i.e. individual beliefs, since rationality and truth are 
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universal), Heraclitus provokes thinking and that he is very critical on his 
predecessors views. I think that Long is mostly right in his description of the 
modus of Heraclitus, but this still does not give us the questions that Heraclitus 
was asking. I will shortly go through my view on Heraclitus, then provide some 
questions Heraclitus was asking and then go through the answers he gave for 
these questions. 
 
In my opinion, Heraclitus was not satisfied with his predecessors wide scope of 
interests. 
 
“Learning many things does not teach noos. Else it would have taught Hesiod 
and Pythagoras, as well as Xenophanes and Hecataeus.”71 (DK.40). 
 
 Heraclitus still sees that it is important to study these many things (DK.35)72, 
but that it is far more important to see the Unity than just The Many Things.  
 ”Latent structure (harmoniê) is master of visible structure”73(DK54). The 
visible structure would be that of strife (DK.80)74, war between opposite 
elements, but the latent, hidden structure is revealed to us: “They do not 
understand how being at variance with itself it agrees: back-turning structure as 
of a bow or a lyre”75(DK.51).  
 
Wisdom is the key element for Heraclitus in getting to understand this ‘hidden 
structure’: ”Wisdom is one thing: to know the will that steers all things through 
all”76(DK.41). In this fragment, Graham has chosen to use ‘will’ for gnome, 
whereas Kahn translates this as ‘plan’77. In either case there lies a strain of 
cosmic god or higher intelligence78, working in the world. 
 
                                               
71 Graham, p.181 [tarkista tarkka sivu!) 
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73 Hussey 1999, p.91 
74 DK.80: “War is common because the Logos that is the law of all becoming is a law of strife, of 
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In my view, we should not view these fragments literally, but understand that in 
Heraclitus’ time, philosophers had not yet distanced thoroughly from the idea of 
Active Deity. So this reference to divine should be taken as ennobling, stylistic 
choice. In my opinion it is essential to understand that Heraclitus’ language 
plays an important role in getting his message, Logos, through to the reader. So 
in the case of what is usually regarded as the first fragment, we should 
understand that Heraclitus is about to tell what is Wisdom:” ”Of this logos 
which is always people prove to have no understanding, both before they hear 
[of?] it and when once they have heard it.”79 (DK.1). This Logos is not limited 
to that of just element-theory, but the reflects the whole content of Heraclitus’ 
thought. 
 
Heraclitus compares Logos to law in interesting ways, but we could say that 
both of the ideas on Logos, as the poetic word deriving inspiration from the 
divine and as the law, are still both important. It is interesting that another 
thinker in another culture was in the same shift from the Active Deity to the 
Universal Law. Lao Zi, whose ideas on Dao I will examine in his own chapter, 
has both connotations in his Dao. 
 
What now where the questions of Heraclitus and how did he answer them? In 
the beginning I sketched few questions; There is plurality, but what kind of 
unity is there in the world? There seems to be regularities in the changes that 
take place in the world, what are these and why are there such? 
 
For the first one Heraclitus’ answer might go as the following: the underlying 
Unity is Logos. When man understands this One (Logos), man can understand 
The Many (plural entities). It seems to me that Logos can not be reduced to the 
mere pattern in change (the element theory), but should be understood in a more 
broader way; as a Heraclitus’ genuine attempt to give an Account on All Things, 
that is in the lines of natural philosophy originating from Miletus80. And while it 
is essential to give an account on All Things, “.., distinguishing each according 
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to its nature (physis) and telling how it is.”81 (DK.1), the real wisdom lies in 
understanding the Unity, hen panta (All things are One). So we should 
recognize the Many (plurality), but strife for The One (unity). When one 
understands Logos he can also understand the nature (physis) of each thing. 
To me it seems that Heraclitus is not making an ontological claim in his hen 
panta, but seeking a unifying understanding. For this reason I have described 
him in the beginning as ontological pluralist, but as an epistemic monist. 
 
Now for the second question that I omitted to Heraclitus; There seems to be 
regularities in the changes that take place in the world, what are these and why 
are there such? The what-question is the simpler one; the regularities in the 
world are part of the cosmic play, where change starts from fire, then to earth, 
and then to water (sea). Then this elemental change is reversed; from water to 
earth, and from earth to fire. So in my opinion elemental theory is Heraclitus’ 
answer to his predecessors, it describes the regularity that lies in change. 
 
The why-question is a bit trickier one. Why are there regularities in the change? 
Heraclitus is swinging between the idea of Active Deity as the one who ensures 
this regularity, and that of Logos as Law, according to which all things come to 
be; “.., for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still 
left over.”82 (DK.114). This idea of the supreme law, that is above any mortal 
law, is very interesting. It reflects the shift from idea of Active Deity to that of 
Universal Law. As I mentioned, my goal is to compare these ideas of Deity and 
Law to the notions that Lao Zi 
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PARMENIDES 
 
 
 
 
The dichotomy between One and The Many is considerably clearer in 
Parmenides than in the case of Heraclitus. But by no means is it simple by 
nature. In Parmenides fragments the One and The Many have their own Ways; 
The Way of Truth (Aletheia) opens an aspect to The One, and the Way of 
Seeming (Doxa) opens an aspect the world of The Many. This aspect-related 
thinking is close to what Lao Zi was promoting, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. For Lao Zi too the world can be attended as The One (monistic) or as 
the Many (pluralistic). But let us first see what is Parmenides’ take on The One 
and The Many. 
 
On the literature on Parmenides I find A.H. Coxon’s studies as the most useful, 
since he is a modern scholar that comes with a general theory on Parmenides’ 
thought. Other scholars have their strengths, but none of them is representing a 
coherent view on Parmenides’ philosophy as a whole. 
G.E.L. Owen concentrates very much on esti (what-is) and is in my opinion 
giving a very good proofs for his theory on this word. But to concentrate on one 
single word, which although is essential, disregards many of the features of 
Parmenides’ philosophy. David Sedley hasn’t come up with a book on the 
Parmenides’ philosophy, but I hold his articles on the subject to be credible. 
Patricia Curd’s The Legacy of Parmenides does have its merits, but this work 
stands against the standard modern interpretation and the ancient account on 
Parmenides. Alexander P.D. Mourelatos has written a book on Parmenides, but 
the weakness of his work lies in my opinion on the fact that it doesn’t come up 
with a general theory on Parmenides’ thought. As a scholar work it is of the first 
rate, but it is of little use for a philosopher looking for a general theory on 
Parmenides’ philosophy.  
 
For me the questions that Parmenides is asking and the ones I’m trying to find 
his answers are: What is reality like in its ultimate level, what is The Most 
Fundamental Reality like? Why do people think there is change? 
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When examining Parmenides, we see a change in the emphasis of philosophy. If 
for Heraclitus change was in the core of philosophizing, then for Parmenides it 
lies in the immobile heart of Being. These philosophers were even in ancient 
times understood to hold opposite conceptions of the nature of true reality; for 
Heraclitus change was real and this change had a pattern in it, namely logos. But 
for Parmenides, as we shall see, the whole concept of change is a grievous 
mistake of the mortals (i.e. common people or his predecessors83), which shades 
the true nature of unchanging reality. 
 
I noted in the previous chapter of the difficulties we face when investigating pre-
Socratic thinkers. In the case of Parmenides the problems arise when we try to 
make a general view of his thinking. It is difficult to tell from the remaining 
material, what was the original relationship between the way of truth (Aletheia) 
and the way of seeming (Doxa). It has been estimated that the Doxa-part made 
up probably 2/3 of the whole work84. Nevertheless, a very important part of 
Parmenides’ thought, that of concerning aletheia, has been preserved in 
fragment 8. The ordering of the remaining fragments stands as an ongoing 
question, but in general, time has been more merciful on Parmenides’ work than 
the other pre-Socratics85.  
 
It was seen in the chapter addressing the cultural differences, that in Greece it 
became a custom to give and demand rational arguments, probably due to the 
competitive nature of the philosophical schools. Parmenides doesn’t name his 
adversaries and even himself talks of aletheia, as a Way of Persuasion86, but it is 
clear that he does see his account to surpass those of his predecessors. 
Parmenides does give arguments to support his views, but these are all pretty 
inconclusive. In my opinion, the main difference between Parmenides and Lao 
Zi, the subject of the next chapter, does not lie necessarily in the ways of 
persuasion, where one can find resemblances, but in their attitude towards those 
seeing the world as pluralistic. Both of them held that what-is can be approached 
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in two different ways, although Parmenides seems to be more keen to make 
reservations on the Way of Seeming (doxa), which leads to pluralism. 
 
 
The Journey 
 
Parmenides’ philosophy is written in allegorical prose, where a young man 
(kouros) is taken to a journey that leads him to the gates of Night and Day and 
through them. Here he meets goddess, who has a special reason for bringing 
kouros (young man) to her: 
 
”You must be informed of everything, both of the unmoved heart of persuasive 
reality and of the beliefs of mortals, which comprise no genuine 
conviction;..”87.(DK.1) 
 
The fact that this gate of Night and Day is probably the gates of tartarus, lets 
one understand that the way to truth is somehow similar to anticipating death88, 
for this gate is where man steps in to the divine world89. Recently there has been 
a growing interest to Parmenides’ mystical undertone and connections with 
mystical practices90, but due to the limited space, I will not dwell in these issues, 
although they do deserve a careful examination of their own.  
 
Goddess goes on to describing three routes to examine Being. One, that 
  
“..a thing is, and that it is not for not being, is the journey of 
persuasion,..”91(DK.1).  
 
This makes a demand for us when we speak of what-is; being for Parmenides is 
radical in the sense, that on this road, what is is and what is not, is not. This 
seemingly stupefying sentence comes as one of the cornerstones when 
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Parmenides lays his philosophical argumentation about the illusionary nature of 
change. 
 
The second route is one that states: 
 
“..,that a thing is not and that it must needs not be, this I tell you is a path 
wholly without report, for you can neither know what is not (for it is impossible) 
nor tell of it..”92.(DK.1) 
 
As can be seen, this second route is rejected by the goddess. The reason being 
that from this route there is no report, since one can not know what is not, and 
therefore there is nothing to tell93.  
We’ll see later on that Parmenides is quite rigorous when it comes down to the 
question what can be thought and what is approved as the subject for this 
thought. For Parmenides is in search of thinking that is about something, and 
thought concerning Nothing (a thing that is not) can be no genuine thought. 
 
Third route that the goddess describes, goes in the lines that: 
 
”…on which mortals with no understanding stray two-headed, […], people 
without judgement, by whom this has been accepted as both being and not being 
the same and not the same, and for all of whom their journey turns backward 
again.”94.(DK.1) 
 
In here we can get the first glimpse why the opinions of mortals (i.e. common 
people or natural philosophers) stand wrong. Mortals think that we say or think 
something when we talk about something that at one point is and at another 
isn’t. For Parmenides this is not thinking with real objects since at some point 
these things are and at another they are not, their existence is not real. But why 
is it that Parmenides is calling mortals two-headed? It has to do with the number 
of substances they suppose to exist: 
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”For they resolved to name two Forms (of which it is wrong to name only one, 
wherein men have gone astray),..”95(DK.8) 
 
Parmenides brings his arguments and stand-points in a bizarre pattern, but an 
ideal form to deductive argumentation was not given before Aristotle. But the 
passage arguments that it is wrong to see the world through two different 
elements, and this is the first sign of Parmenides’ metaphysical monism96. 
 
 
Aletheia 
 
It was noted that the goddess points three possible routes to inquiry. She turns 
down two of these and 
 
“Only one story is still left: that a thing is”97(DK.7) 
 
This route is called by the name aletheia, the Way of Truth. Parmenides sees 
that this route will lead to a genuine thought about and understanding of what-
is98.  
 
The point of Parmenides is that since the objects of everyday life change and 
disappear (can be said to be and not-to-be at some point), they are not what 
really is. Parmenides is obsessed with finding this entity that can be said to 
exist, to really be, and major part of his survived fragments deals with what this 
entity is like. Parmenides doesn’t so much point out what that thing is, but does 
give some outlines what is it like. The fact that Parmenides gives only outlines 
for his esti (what-is, without a subject, open is), has lead to the huge variations 
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in the opinions of modern scholars of what is the subject of this esti. Patricia 
Curd proposes in her work that Parmenides represents the view of predicational 
monism. She makes the point:”…that Parmenides was interested both in the 
criteria for a proper account of what-is – that is, the fundamental entity or 
entities in an account of kosmos – as well as in the metaphysical requirements 
any such entity must meet. Such an entity, after all, is the goal of the route of 
inquiry.”99. 
 
There is a lot that I can agree in that statement, namely Parmenides’ interest on 
what-is and that he was interested in the metaphysical requirements that such an 
entity must meet. But I must say I disagree with the view that Parmenides was a 
firstly cosmologist and that his program could give rise to plurality, if we are to 
follow the guidelines represented in aletheia. Parmenides’ program is much 
more philosophically refined than his predecessors’, he literally pulls of the rug 
underneath them. For him their, the physilogoi, natural philosophers, mistake is 
of orientation, they took the illusions of the phenomenal world as their stepping 
stone. As we shall see, for Parmenides, the Most Fundamental Reality is itself 
unchanging. Since my interpretation of Parmenides is closer to standard 
interpretation, I shall mainly refer to Coxon, Sedley and Owen, and to lesser 
extent to Curd and Mourelatos.  
 
Sedley points out that Parmenides is quite rigorous in his logic, to him there are 
no half-truths, no question can be answered yes and no100. This leads him to 
abandon the concepts of mortals, where things change and disappear, and can 
therefore be attributed is and is-not in some time101. In fact, Parmenides favours 
pure reason over sense-data: 
 
                                               
99 Curd, p.67 
100 Sedley, p.115, “Parmenides and Melissus”, The Cambridge Companion to early Greek 
Philosophy 
101 We shall see later that Parmenides doesn’t approve the reality of time and therefore his esti 
can not be changing 
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”..let no habit do violence to you on the empirical way of exercising an unseeing 
eye and a noisy ear and tongue, but decide by discourse [i.e. by thinking] the 
controversial test enjoined by me.”102 
(DK.7) 
 
So the method of testing can be gathered as thus: what can be said to be, and 
thus the only object for thinking, is in Parmenides’ words: 
 
 “…Being [what-is] is ungenerated and imperishable, entire, unique, unmoved 
and perfect;..”103.(DK.8) 
 
For Parmenides Being cannot be born from not-Being, Being is not coming to 
be or perishing, Being is indivisible and there is no distinctions in Being (what-
is).104.  
 
Parmenides goes on in fragment 8 to prove his standpoint to a degree that had no 
equivalent in his days and he does give some arguments to support his views. It 
is clear that he is willing to defend his point: 
 
“Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike and not any more in degree in some 
respect, which might keep it from uniting, or any inferior, but is all full of 
Being.105 (DK.8) 
 
From this premise that all Being is uniform Parmenides deduces that Being is a 
single individual106: 
 
“Therefore it is all united, for Being is adjacent to Being.”107 (DK.8) 
 
                                               
102 Coxon, p. 58, and as a prove of abandoning the senses in favor of pure reason, Sedley, p.117 
103 Coxon, p.60 
104 Coxon, p.64 
105 coxon, p.66 
106 Coxon, p.203 
107 Coxon, p.66 
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It should be clarified that in the last passage above, Parmenides is refusing the 
idea that Being could be divided by something that is not-Being. And the 
reasoning for it goes in the lines: 
 
“.., because it is not lawful that Being should be incomplete, for it is not 
defective, whereas Not-being would lack everything.”108 (DK.8) 
 
Here one can see the similarities between Parmenides and later rationalists, such 
as Descartes. From a concept of Being, is deduced the nature of Being. Being is 
ungenerated and imperishable, entire, unique, unmoved and perfect. Very often 
in the argumentation of Parmenides, first appears the premises, then the 
conclusion, after this appears a chain of assertions and with the help of these, the 
premises are attached to the conclusions109. But this odd order of proving a point 
should not prevent us from seeing the depths of his metaphysics, for Parmenides 
has one more piece of shocking news, at least to his contemporaries:  
 
”And time is not nor will be another thing alongside Being,..”110 (DK.8) 
 
Time cannot be used to analyze reality for Being is changeless. It would be hard 
to come up with anything more shocking to his contemporary colleagues than 
this. Many of them, Heraclitus in particular, had taken change as a natural 
starting place for their philosophical inquiries. And now there appears a man 
that denies not only the plurality of entities, but also time which rests on their 
starting point, the concept of change. But Parmenides sticks it just a little bit 
deeper, in to the heart of the whole issue: 
 
”.., since this [Being] was bound by fate to be entire and changeless. Therefore 
all those things will be [nothing more than] a name, which mortals, confident 
that they are real, suppose to be coming to be and perishing, to be and not to be, 
                                               
108 Coxon, p.70 
109 Coxon, p.212 
110 Coxon, p.70-72 
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and to change their place and alter their bright aspect to dark and from dark to 
bright.”111(DK.8) 
 
Parmenides now has what he perceives as The Most Ultimate Reality. It is 
ungenerated and unperishing , a single whole, unmoving, and perfect112. In this 
most fundamental reality there is no time or change, Being is of one continuous 
substance, where no distinctions (into pluralities) can be made.  
 
“..; it never was nor will be, since it is now all together, one indivisible. For 
what parentage of it would you look for?”113 (DK.8) 
 
In this passage Parmenides is convincing us that he is really talking about the 
ultimate reality, the very thing that is the focus of his deep metaphysical 
considerations. It is somewhat surprising that Lao Zi uses almost the very same 
words, when insisting the reader to step to the abyss of The Most Fundamental 
Reality.114 
 
But Parmenides does not possess the qualities of a die-hard sceptic, like his 
pupil Zeno did, but goes on to giving a positive account of things, from the 
pluralist view-point, starting from the premises closer to his contemporaries. 
 
 “Therewith I put a stop for you to my reliable discourse and thought about 
reality; from this point learn human beliefs, hearing the deceptive composition 
of my verse.”115 (DK.8) 
 
While this account to follow is not entirely reliable, if at all, the goddess 
nevertheless presents it as the best possible one, concerning the common 
premise, that there are two elements working in the world. One should 
remember that in Parmenides’ opinion we shouldn’t really divide Being into 
                                               
111 Coxon, p.72-74 
112 Sedley, p.118 
113 Coxon, p.62 
114 I return to this at the Conclusions-chapter of this work 
115 Coxon, p.76 
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parts116. Parmenides is then giving a response to his Ionian colleagues, the 
natural philosophers, even though he thinks their starting point is erroneous.  
 
 
Doxa 
 
Doxa, the way of seeming, occupies a disputed place in Parmenides’ thought. 
Curd holds the opinion that the lesson of doxa “..is neither that cosmology is 
unacceptable, nor that, as an account  of sense-experience, it has lesser value. 
Rather I argue that Parmenides supposes that his model in the Doxa would yield 
a rationally grounded cosmology if the basic entities of such a theory met the 
criteria of B8 (fr.8) for what-is.”117 
What is the weight that we should put on Parmenides’ doxa? What was he after 
when he wanted to give an account on the lines of his predecessors (i.e. 
mortals)? What is the place of doxa in Parmenides’ thought? 
 
I see that Curd is partially neglecting the negative modus that Parmenides gives 
to this way of seeming. It is clear that much less credibility is led to The Way of 
Seeming, than to The Way of Truth. Mourelatos sees the goddess as saying: “ 
‘You shall learn about truth, and about opinions; but nevertheless, you shall 
learn this also.”118. So it must be that these two routes, aletheia and doxa, are not 
describing two parts of a single project, but are separated by the goddess herself 
to be of different credibility, when she moves from The Way of Truth to The 
Way of Seeming:  
 
”Therewith I put a stop for you to my reliable discourse and thought about 
reality; from this point learn human beliefs, hearing the deceptive composition 
of my verse.”119(DK.8) 
 
                                               
116 Sedley, p.122-123 
117 Curd, p.6 
118 Mourelatos, p.209, in the footnote M. is saying that it doesn’t matter that the single ”this”, 
poses no real problem for this interpretation 
119 Coxon, p.76 
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Parmenides has already outlawed any kind of plurality in the ultimate level, 
what-is has already been described as a single kind. The lesson is obvious the 
goddess gives this (plural) account of things: 
 
 ”..in order that no opinion of mortals may outstrip you.”120(DK.8) 
 
It is not on The Way of Truth, but on The Way of Seeming that this program is 
presented. One must come to the conclusion that this is the best possible 
cosmology that can be given in the lines of mortals121, in other words when we 
are forced to talk about change and therefore use plurality of entities122. 
 
A.A.Long argues that we should understand that the focus of pre-Socratic 
philosophers was to give an account of “all things”123. This means that these 
philosophers had not yet formed a common conception of what philosophy is; 
their interests varied from meteorological observations to religious speculation, 
from wisdom to the nature of the kosmos. So we could do well in taking 
Parmenides by his own words, what was the focus of doxa: 
 
 ”You will know the aether’s origin, and likewise all the signs in the aether and 
the invisible deeds of the pure torch of the brilliant sun and whence they 
sprang;..”124(DK.10) 
 
And this is just a part of it; Parmenides goes on in the next fragment to explain: 
 
 “..how earth and sun and moon and universal aether and celestial galaxy and 
extreme Olympus and the stars’ hot power started to come into 
being.”125(DK.10) 
 
                                               
120 Sedley, p.123 
121 Sedley, p.123 
122 I see it that Curd is interprets P. in a light of atomists. I agree that they took the ‘verification 
of the entity’-part, i.e. were testing their ideas of the object of a genuine thought, that is 
unchanging and lasting, but in my opinion, stayed quite intact of other Parmenidean influences, 
such as his monism. 
123 Long, p.10-13 
124 Coxon, p. 80 
125 Coxon, p.82 
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Here is a clear sign that on doxa Parmenides was on a quest to give his own 
account of “all things” to his rivals. In aletheia Parmenides reveals his view that 
these accounts do not concern the ultimate reality, which is changeless, but he 
never the less starts his account in the way ‘if you want to discuss about this 
world offered by senses, here’s how to do it’. 
 
As we have now a conception of the role and relationship between aletheia and 
doxa, I will shortly describe what parmenidean ‘physics’ is like as presented in 
doxa. As was noted, there are two kinds of substances in play, in the ‘beliefs of 
mortals’. 
 
  “For they resolved to name two Forms (of which it is wrong to name only one, 
wherein men have gone astray), and they chose opposites in body and assigned 
them marks separate from one another, on the one hand aetherial fire of flame, 
being mild, immensely light, the same with itself in every direction but not the 
same as the other; that, on the other hand, being likewise in itself the opposites, 
unintelligent night, a dense and heavy body.”126(DK.8) 
 
So Parmenides sees that in ‘physics’, one must see things through a dualistic 
order or elements; Fire being gentle, bright and self-identical, Night being 
unintelligent, dense and heavy. It is plausible that Parmenides’ starting-point for 
this dualistic order is Pythagorean, the difference being that he sees that Fire 
(brightness) is associated with femininity and Night (darkness) with 
masculinity127. In my opinion it is interesting that Parmenides chose to envisage 
reason (or wisdom) in the form of a woman and with feminine attributes. 
Goddess is pointing to aletheia as a way of persuasion, “for persuasion attends 
the truth”. Even on this most crucial point of his philosophy (what is it that is), 
he withdraws from stating and urges us to use our own reason. This identifying 
of our highest capabilities with feminine virtues is just one of those little strings 
that attach Parmenides to Lao Zi, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
 
But Parmenides has a little bit more to tell about these two Forms:  
                                               
126 Coxon, p.76-78 
127 Coxon, p.219 
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“Now since light and night have been given all names, and the names 
corresponding to their potencies have been given to these things and those, all is 
full of light and invisible night together, both of them equal, since in neither is 
there nothing.”128 (DK.9) 
 
Even if there are considerable gaps in the fragments concerning the doxa-part, 
we can nevertheless sum up the general features of Parmenides’ conception of 
‘the best possible theory of Two-headed mortals’. Sensible objects and their 
properties can be analyzed through Two forms (elements), namely Night and 
Day. Even though they carry oppositional characteristics, they are equal. In none 
of the remaining fragments is Parmenides implying that one Form is higher in 
status or otherwise to be considered superior role in their exchange129. 
 
And what is the place for monism and pluralism in Parmenides’ thought?  
 
“Thus, I say, according to belief these things originated and now are and in 
later times hereafter, having received their sustenance, will end. On them men 
bestowed a name to give its mark to each.”130 
 
Mourelatos holds the opinion that Parmenides is not holistic monist, but that his 
monism is essentially non-dualistic. He notices that in none of the extant 
fragments, is Parmenides using the word “many” to refer to plural entities131. 
But the fragment above makes it clear that pluralism is the focus of Parmenides’ 
attack; it is the fallacy of men to bestow names to entities that are coming-to-be 
and perishing away. And it is clear that this pluralism takes place in doxa, for 
this fragment talks in the lines that Parmenides has already outlawed in his 
aletheia, about the objects that are coming-to-be and passing-away. Those kind 
of entities are not real in Parmenides view, as seen in aletheia, but are merely 
illusionary appearances, whose value lies in their currency in everyday-life132. 
                                               
128 Coxon, p.84 
129 Coxon, p.233 
130 Coxon, p.92 
131 Mourelatos, p.130-133 
132 Coxon, p.256 
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For all of this, I would say that ‘holistic monism’ is a suitable term for 
Parmenides’ point, presented in aletheia. 
 
I take the following to be a credible interpretation of Parmenides’ philosophy; 
Aletheia presents us the ultimate reality; changeless, timeless and monistic in 
nature. Doxa gives an account in the lines of his predecessors; world as 
changing, temporal and pluralistic. For Parmenides Aletheia reflects the more 
fundamental conception on the Being than Doxa, but Doxa can not be 
condemned as a hoax, it has some credibility, even though settling the degree of 
that credibility is difficult even for the goddess: 
 
“This order of things I declare to you to likely in its entirety, in such a way that 
never shall any mortal outstrip you in practical judgement.”133 (DK.8) 
 
So while doxa is not wholly credible, it is still the best way of analyzing the 
Being from pluralistic point of view. Parmenides however insists that we 
consider the Being as a single whole without segregating or dividing of Being. 
 
 
 
Conclusions On Parmenides 
 
As we now have made observations on Parmenides concept of change and 
totality, it is time to ask in the lines of Lloyd, what were the questions that 
Parmenides was asking? Coxon sums up the questions as 1) What, if anything, 
can be said or thought to be, without any kind of possibility to deny its 
existence? i.e. What is that is? 2) What else can be said about this what-is? Can 
anything else be said about it?134.  
 
In the beginning of this chapter I gave the questions that Parmenides might have 
been asking. What is reality like in its ultimate level, what is The Most 
Fundamental Reality like? Why do people think there is change? 
                                               
133 Coxon, p.78 
134 Coxon, p.20 
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It is essential to remember that Parmenides project was influenced by his 
predecessors, whose goal was to give an account of “all things”. 
  
In aletheia Parmenides goes on to describe his concept of what really exists, 
what is reality like in its ultimate level. As noted, this Being (what-is) is 
ungenerated, imperishable, timeless and a single whole. It is hard for me to see 
that this would be something else than holistic monism, that was disregarded by 
Mourelatos and Curd. 
 
Secondly, on the Way of Seeming, Parmenides seems to give an account of “all 
things”, as response to his predecessors and contemporaries. He sees that in the 
majority of these systems, if not in all of them, there are two kinds of Forms 
(elements) in play, and this is the error they make and end up with a concept of a 
changing world. This critique fits well to Heraclitus who establishes his 
philosophy on the concept strife between opposite forces. 
 
If aletheia presents Parmenides own view of truth, we must conclude that doxa 
does not receive as high credibility for Parmenides. Why was it then that he felt 
compelled to come up with this part? He had already drawn his bow, but he still 
needed to direct the arrow to its goal. Parmenides is literally pulling the rug 
beneath his opponent when he says that the change which was the starting point 
or the thing that needed explicating does not in reality exist. This in Parmenides 
view puts his philosophy in to higher regard than that of his predecessors. His 
system is not based on dualisms of any kind, and his objects of thought can not 
be said to come-into-being or perishing-away; he is thinking with real object, 
not with some everyday objects that in fact do not really exist.  
 
It is as intriguing as it is speculative, to eschew Parmenides motif for his 
monism. Majority of modern researchers agree that Parmenides was entangled 
in mystic practices. To me these practices could seem to be firstly that of 
meditation, for he would not be the first one to end up with monistic views via 
these practices. But this line of thought is in serious need of extra-
considerations. It is clear already in the philosophy of Parmenides that he is after 
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The Most Fundamental Reality. He is taken to a journey by goddess herself, he 
is envisaged the truth of divine kind, instead of mortal opinions. I would do very 
well in closing this chapter by a remark made by a scholar whose impact on the 
field of pre-Socratic thought have been tremendous: ”Parmenides’ logic must 
have seemed to him…a path beyond the limits of mortality. ‘A mortal must 
think mortal, not immortal, thoughts’, had been the common belief. And mortal 
thoughts never strike certainty; by common consent this was the privilege of the 
gods. Yet in his doctrine of Being, Parmenides found certitude and security such 
as no god could surpass.”135. This short passage from Gregory Vlastos goes well 
to highlight the focus of my interpretation of Parmenides; he really sees that he 
has attached a higher truth of what-is, exists than his contemporaries. His 
predecessors mistake was to analyze of what-is, via two forms, where Being 
itself is timeless, undivided single whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
135 .”, Vlastos, Gregory, p.75: “Parmenides’ Theory of Knowledge”, (orig. TAPA 77 (1946)). 
Reprinted in Studies in Greek Philosophy  
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LAO ZI 
 
 
Now that we have come to the last philosopher of this paper, we face different 
kinds of challenges than with Heraclitus and Parmenides. The main controversy 
is the existence of Lao Zi (literally Old Master) and his authorship of the Dao 
De Jing. It has been noted, by Victor H. Mair 136and others, that Lao Zi’s work 
carries many resemblances to Indian philosophy, and this has led some scholars 
to a view that the work itself, Dao De Jing, is a compilation of ‘Sayings of the 
Old’, influenced by Indian philosophy. Before briefly considering the evidence 
of Lao Zi’s existence, I go through the standard story. 
 
According to the legend Lao Zi’s original name was Li Er and he was the head 
of the national library of the Zhou dynasty during 580-500 B.C.137. Vast 
majority of Chinese scholars see that the basics of this account stand correct, 
among these scholars are Wang Keping, Guo Moruo, Ma Shulun, Ren Jiyu, 
Zhan Jianfeng and many others138. For this view speaks the fact that Lao Zi is 
mentioned in Shiji (109-91 BC) which was written by Sima Qian . Wang also 
sees that the work has its own structure and logic, and that the language used 
dates to the late Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 BC) and that some 
expressions carry resemblance to the language used in Warring State Period 
(mid 4th to early 3rd century B.C.), when it was modified139.  
 
The opinion that De Dao Jing is a compilation of originally oral proverbs is held 
by Naito Konan, Kimura Eiichi, Victor H. Mair and Michael LaFargue, among 
others140. Csikszentmihalyi notes that Sima Qian uses very often expressions, 
such as ‘some say’, ‘in general’ and ‘it is said’, which gives an impression that 
he didn’t have any first hand source on Lao Zi, but that he was going through 
                                               
136 See Mair, Victor, H.: Tao Te Ching 
137 Wang, p.4 
138 Wang, p.4 
139 Wang, p.5 
140 Csikszentmihalyi, p.4, “Introduction”, Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi, (ed. 
Mark Csikszentmihalyi & Philip J. Ivanhoe) 
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the common folk-say. This interpretation does not, however, deny that there are 
interesting philosophical views in Dao De Jing. 
 
The issue have been further clouded by the fact that there have been discoveries 
of the earlier versions of Dao De Jing. In 1973 a tomb was excavated in 
Mawangdui and inside was found the earliest complete version of Dao De Jing, 
which scientists dated to around 200 B.C.141 This version is quite similar to the 
traditional version of the book. But in 1993 there was a new finding in Guodian 
which scientists date to approximately 300 B.C.142 This version includes only 31 
fragmentary chapters when current version has in total 81143 chapters. It might 
be that there was a wider source, “various masters”-corpus for example, out of 
which the different versions of Dao De Jing were compiled144. But it can also be 
the case that the material was copied from Dao De Jing, which could have 
existed already then145. In either case, the traditional story stands correct and 
there really lived a person who was identified as Lao Zi or that the book is a 
compilation of oral sayings, even those regarding the text as a collection, hold 
the view that the oldest parts date to 550 B.C.146 
 
My take on this controversial issue is that Dao De Jing has several layers in it 
which were written at different times. I find it hard to believe that it would be 
written by one man alone, but this of course doesn’t exclude the possibility that 
there really was a person identified as Lao Zi, who could have had followers 
who identified Lao Zi as the Master of their school. This school then came up 
with new material for what we now know as Dao De Jing. This school might 
have later then opposed the Confucian ideas prevailing at their time147 
 
I shall not dwell any longer on the new material found, since its meaning, 
significance and influence on interpretation is still under research by scholars. I 
                                               
141 Wang, p.26 
142 Allan, p.239, “The Great One, Water, and The Laozi: New Light from Guodian”, T’oung 
Pao, LXXXIX, 2003 
143 Csikszentmihalyi, p.5 
144 Csikszentmihalyi, p.10 
145 Allan, p.241-242 
146 Mair, the Cosmic Track, p. 16-18, also published 1990 as Mair’s Tao Te Ching 
147 The Dao De Jing criticizes quite openly some of the Confucian ideas. See Slingerland p.81-
82  
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nevertheless doubt that there is going to be any groundbreaking material that 
would alter the whole view on Lao Zi’s thinking. Therefore I’m inclined to 
follow the traditional interpretation of the philosophy expressed in De Dao Jing, 
or to put it more accurately, the broad outlines of the traditional interpretation. I 
see that the text has a reasonable amount of coherence that it can be treated as a 
philosophical text, or that its coherence is at least the same regard as 
Heraclitus’. I do although see that there is a strong probability that the 
philosophy written down in  Dao De Jing altered during the time, and personally 
I hold the opinion that the relationship between  some of the key-concepts (wu, 
you, Dao, De) changed during the time. I will discuss on this view briefly later 
on in this work. 
 
It is not only that the origin of the book remains a mystery, but the language 
itself gives possibilities to several interpretations. The differences between 
modern Chinese and ancient one are remarkable148, also the meaning of the 
characters have changed during time and the book has been edited. The way of 
Lao Zi’s writing is open to several interpretations and there one can find 
suggestive phrases as well as philosophical points which are suggestive in 
nature. 
 
Now that we have considered the history of the work and its authorship, we can 
proceed to concern its content. Whether the work has one or several authors it 
has had an enormous impact on Chinese thought. This influence is due to the 
very deep philosophical considerations it includes, De Dao Jing discusses such 
topics as war, governing, ideal of a Sage and so on. In this work I shall 
concentrate more on the metaphysical and ontological aspects, and leave aside 
the more mundane aspects of Dao De Jing.  
 
Some scholars have been eager to see the work either as a religious or 
philosophical in its orientation . I personally do not see such a split in 
interpretations as sensible149, but I’m inclined to say that the language used 
                                               
148 Mair, the cosmic track, p.22 
149 This dividing into religious and philosophical readings of DDJ is in my opinion needless. 
DDJ has spiritual and philosophical ideas which are intertwined in interesting fashion. 
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contains some metaphors which I would call suggestive, a style that calls the 
reader to ponder things himself. It might also be that there is some references to 
meditative practices in the book, but straight references to these kind of a 
practices are quite few and shouldn’t make it an impossibility to compare Lao 
Zi’s work to that of Heraclitus and Parmenides, who them selves have similar 
kind of suggestive tone and could also have advocated the use of meditative 
practices of some sort.150  
 
 
Dao 
 
The notion of Dao is central in order to understand Lao Zi’s thinking, in a very 
same way that  Logos is a key-concept to understand Heraclitus. In a similar 
way, both of these thinkers gave a new sense to the word, on which they were 
building their philosophical foundations on. Before Lao Zi, according to Tong 
Shuye151, the notion of Dao sprang from the notion of ming (fate152), in the 
August and Spring period (770-476 B.C.). Since the idea of personal deities was 
somewhat discarded, thinkers started to come up with different kind of ideas and 
concepts regulating the world. The historical background in this sense was not 
that different from that of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ historical context. 
 
What I’m trying to show in this chapter is that Lao Zi’s Dao isn’t a person or a 
thing with personal qualities, but it is the Law and the Source of the Most 
Profound Reality. We should also note that Lao Zi is cutting loose from the 
solely religious tradition of his time153. 
 
                                               
150 Kingsley has examined these practices in Parmenides, but it might be that he is exaggerating 
these features(Kingsley: In the dark places of wisdom). Kahn on the other hand sees that it is 
probable that for Heraclitus the microcosm reflects the macrocosm, the world (Kahn, p.21). This 
could explain the Heraclitus’ statement “I went in search of myself”(DK.101).  
151 I’m forced to refer on this instance to Wang’s book, since I didn’t have an access to Tong’s 
book. Wang, p.24-25 
152 This ming could also be translated as ”The Dao of Heaven”. Lao Zi didn’t himself come up 
with the concept of Dao, but gave it a new content. 
153 Robinet, p.149, :”The Diverse Interpretations of the Laozi”, Religious and Philosophical 
Aspects of the Laozi 
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The character of Dao can be said to constitute of two different components, 
those being of head and leg. These characters together have been commonly 
interpreted to refer to walking154. Also Dao can refer to a manner or course of 
doing155. The most common translation for Dao is although The Way. ”Way” is 
not a bad translation for the Dao, when we speak in the context of the Dao of 
Heaven, Dao of man, Dao of War etc. In all these instances Dao translates quite 
effortlessly as a ‘way’, for it emphasizes the connotations of Dao as a guide, or 
as a path we have to follow if we are willing to understand or master the nature 
of a phenomenon (i.e.war). But when ‘Dao’ is used alone, as it is in the most 
metaphysical chapters of DDJ, the notion of the way soon looses its practicality, 
for Dao has connotations that are hard to come by in western metaphysics. So 
what is this Dao? 
 
Wang Keping has distinguished four meanings that can be found in 
Dao De Jing: 
1) The proto-material or substance which constitutes the universe; 
2) The potential driving force that creates all things  
3) The underlying law related to the motion and development of all 
things; and 
4) The standard or code with which to measure human conduct.156 
 
In this chapter concerning Lao Zi, I will nevertheless concentrate to Dao as a 
metaphysical concept. So while I will concentrate on 1, 2 and 3, the last 
meaning for Dao will get only a brief discussion. I must say that on Wang’s 1) I 
would edit the word ‘proto-material’ out and concentrate to Dao as a substance. 
‘Proto-material’ is not suitable, for Lao Zi does not talk about matter or about 
the birth of matter. In my view even talk of a substance can be somewhat 
misleading, due to the fact that this western concept has very much the 
connotations it became to carry in the hands of western philosophers (Spinoza 
for example), but ‘substance’ is a quite good notion as one meaning for Dao, but 
it has its short-comes as well. 
                                               
154 Tao Zhijian, p.114, “Dao, Logos and Différance”, Tao: reception in East and West 
155 Hansen, p.191, Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy  
156 Wang, p.32 
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Substance is understood generally in philosophy as that which ‘stands under’ 
and is permanent by nature, in this sense ‘substance’ is a suitable term for Dao. 
But as said, there is no mention of matter in Dao De Jing and neither is Dao 
substance in a sense of carrying attributes. One could of course say something in 
the lines that Dao is the only real substance for Lao Zi since its permanent, 
whereas all the phenomenal beings are temporal. The issue whether ‘substance’ 
suits Dao as a description deserves a study of its own and can not be clarified in 
the limits of this paper. 
 
I also have a little bit different opinion on 2), where I would replace ‘..that 
creates all things’. I would put it that ‘..that all things are born from’, since the 
Dao is referred to as Mother on chapter which deals Dao as the origin of all 
creatures. ‘Mother’ should here be understood as describing the nature of Dao, 
not as stating for some supreme being which is self-conscious.  
 
“There was something undifferentiated and all-embracing, / Which existed 
before Heaven and Earth./ Soundless and formless, it depends on nothing 
external/ And stays inexhaustible.”157 
 
The nature of Dao was hard to explicate even for Lao Zi, but it is clear that Dao 
is not an entity with a personality, like that of Jahve. None of the scholars thinks 
that Dao would be an active, creative God. 
 
 
In my opinion, Lao Zi opens his book with a discussion on The Most 
Fundamental Reality: 
 
 ”The Dao that can be told is not the constant Dao. 
The name that can be named is not the constant Name. 
The Being-without-form [Wu] is the origin of Heaven and Earth; 
The Being-within-form [You] is the mother of myriad things. 
                                               
157 Wang, p.231 
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Therefore it is always from the Being-without-form[Wu] 
     That the subtlety of the Dao can be contemplated; 
Similarly it is always from the Being-within-form[You]  
     That the manifestation of Dao can be perceived. 
These two have the same source but different names, 
     They both may be called deep and profound. 
The Deepest and most profound 
     Is the doorway to all subtleties.”158 
 
 
I have added the wu- and you-concepts on the chapter, for there we can find the 
most intriguing parts for this study. My first task is to show how these concepts 
(wu and you) can be understood to constitute the world as Inseperable One and 
as The Many. In the terms of western metaphysics, I’m trying to show that these 
two concepts come strikingly close to the notions of monism and pluralism. I’m 
going to defend a view that what Lao Zi is in fact saying, is that we can see the 
world as monistic or pluralistic, depending on the stand we take. 
 
The meaning of the opening lines is a topic of its own, there are many studies on 
them and they diverge quite considerably. The two characteristics that should be 
brought from the opening lines are; 1) the Dao that Lao Zi wishes to discuss is 
not a casual object which can be spoken of. The Dao he wishes to discuss is not 
to be captured by language159, and 2) the true Dao cannot be described in 
language, for language is not constant, unlike Dao. So it should be clear that the 
language cannot describe fully Dao, if at all. And that the “Name that can be 
named is not the constant name”, where as what Lao Zi would like to talk about, 
is something that is constant in the changing world. But all this does not quite 
answer the question why is it that Lao Zi’s Dao is inexpressible in language. 
 
I see that the following quotation would be helpful in understanding Lao Zi’s 
Dao: 
                                               
158 Wang, p.22 
159 Bo Mou, p.430-431, “Ultimate Concern and Language Engagement: a re-examination of 
the opening message of the Dao-De-Jing”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27:4 (December 
2000) 
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”When the people of the world know the beautiful as beauty,/ There arises the 
recognition of the ugly./ When they know the good as good,/ There rises the 
recognition of the evil.”160 
 
From this we could gather that for Lao Zi the concepts are born together, they 
are equiprimordial. There can not be an attribute without its opposite, the sense 
of the word requires that we know what is its opposite161. But since Dao is the 
totality of things no description of it is possible on the language level. As I will 
show on this chapter The Dao is not dividable and since there can be no 
negative or positive attributes which would describe this totality of Dao. 
 
Lately there has been a discussion whether we should investigate Dao De Jing, 
as a book primarily  concerning the language engagement and language’s 
capabilities of making notions of the world162. 
I would rather see that Lao Zi is making the point that he is after The Most 
Fundamental Reality, the Dao, which can not be thoroughly described in 
language, as seen in the beginning of the chapter above. 
There really shouldn’t be any doubt that Lao Zi is speaking of the Most 
Fundamental Reality, something that we have to conceive if we are to 
understand the way things really are. Dao is transcendent in a way that if we are 
to pursue true understanding of the world, we have to realize Dao. This is 
crossing-point with Heraclitus, for him it was not Dao, but Logos that a man 
should understand. And for Parmenides it was the Truth, Aletheia, that world is 
One; indivisible unity/entity. 
 
Next I will describe two aspects to Dao; as monistic, inseparable One, and as the 
origin of the beings.  
 
 
                                               
160 Wang, p.221 
161 Wang is pretty much on the same lines with me here (p.104), as well as A.C.Graham: ”The 
trouble with words is not that they do not fit at all but they always fit imperfectly; they can help 
us towards the Way, but only if each formulation in its inadequacy is balanced by the opposite 
which diverges in the other direction.” p.219 
162 See Hansen: A Daoist theory of Chinese thought : a philosophical interpretation  
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Wu: 
 
In the opening chapter we can see that Lao Zi is saying that there are two ways 
to look the world. When we look the world in its wu-aspect (Being-without-
form), “the subtlety of the Dao can be contemplated”. And when we look the 
world in its you-aspect (Being-within-form), “the manifestation of Dao can be 
perceived.”. So, in my interpretation, wu-aspect is the one regarding the world 
as One, and you-aspect regarding the world as Many. So wu and you denote two 
aspects into Dao. 
 
Which one is the more deeper, the view that comes first of the two?  
“The Deepest and most profound/  Is the doorway to all subtleties” 
The view held in chapter 1, states that wu-aspect is the deepest and the most 
profound, for in the first instance Lao Zi talks about wu, as where the subtlety of 
the Dao can be perceived and in the end of the chapter marks that this is the 
deepest and most profound.  
 
Also Ch.1 includes a viewpoint, that: 
“These two have the same source but different names”.  
I would understand this in a way that their ‘source’ refers to the Most Ultimate 
Reality, Dao, that both wu- and you-aspects apprehend, but wu-aspect being the 
higher aspect to view the world. 
 
In many of the chapters, Lao Zi is referring to Dao as empty. This shouldn’t be 
taken literally, but as to describe that on the ultimate level (Dao in its wu-
aspect), there is no distinctions to be made in Dao. Like chapter 14 says: 
 
“You look at it but cannot see it; 
     It is called the imageless. 
You listen to it but cannot hear it; 
   It is called the soundless. 
You touch it but cannot find it;  
   It is called the formless. 
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These tree cannot be further inquired into, 
   For they are the inseparable One.” 
 
Why is it that we cannot say anything about the Dao in its monistic wu-aspect? 
 
“The One is not bright when it is up, 
   And not dark when it is down. 
Infinite and indistinct, it cannot be named, 
   Thus reverting to a state of non-thingness.”163 
 
So when Lao Zi wants to say that he is really talking about The Most 
Fundamental Reality, the reader must understand that this entity, Dao in its wu-
aspect, is 1) inseparable One, 2) infinite and 3) indistinct. These are the features 
when we talk about the Dao in its wu-aspect. Furthermore, “..,it [Dao] cannot be 
named,/ Thus reverting to a state of non-thingness.”. Non-thingness should be 
understood in a way, that there are no individual things or beings, but that 
everything is in a state of not being distinct.  
 
Also I should now point out that the concept “These two have the same source 
but different names”, is a conception that alters later in the book in a way that 
the wu is the origin of you-aspect and that wu-aspect can be attended by 
continuing you-aspect to the beginning of the Pluralistic world. I will come to 
this concept of reversing (fan) later on, but to conclude this part, I would like 
refer to Wang Keping to remind us what is the nature of wu-aspect:"The term 
‘non-thingness’ (wu) does not mean that there is nothing at all. Instead it denotes 
a state of being without shape."164 So Wu-aspect in its entirety attends the world 
which has no shape (individual beings or things), that something can be said of. 
It is the monistic aspect lacking any distinctions.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
163 Wang, p.225 
164 Wang, p.45 
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You 
 
As I said, the relationship between wu- and you-aspects seems to alter in the 
latter chapters of the book. In the first chapter it is stated that they have the same 
source, but in the majority of latter chapters it is stated that you comes from wu, 
and that wu can be attended by reversing, which happens on the way of you. 
Chapter 40 states:  
 
“All things under Heaven come from Being-within-form [you]. And Being-
within-form comes from Being-without-form [wu].”165 
 
So this chapter, as well as many of the latter ones, states that 1) All individual 
creatures can be seen to have a common beginning (you-aspect) and 2) the 
Common Beginning comes from where there is no distinctions to individual 
beings (wu-aspect). So now Dao has two meanings; in its wu-aspect it is the 
One, which is empty in a sense that there is no distinctions. In its you-aspect, it 
is the beginning of the phenomenal world, sometimes referred to as a Mother. 
 
“There was a beginning of a universe,/ Which may be called the mother of the 
universe.  
He who has found the mother,/ Thereby understands her sons; 
He who has understood the sons/ And still keeps to the mother/ Will be free from 
danger throughout his life.”166 
 
When we see the world in its you-aspect (regarding it as plural entities, the 
Sons), the best that we can do, is to understand their common origin(the 
Mother). This idea includes the idea of fan (reversion), as the path to 
understanding the plural phenomenal world. Wang explains the content of fan 
(reversion): 
“It is worth pointing out that Lao Zi, even though emphasizing the opposing 
interrelationship between things and the significant role of their transaction or 
                                               
165 Wang, p.238 
166 Wang, p.243 
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transformation, ultimately focuses on the idea of returning to the root as the final 
destination for all things.”167 
I disagree with Wang on this concept of fan (reversion). As I see it, in Lao Zi’s 
case this ‘reversion’ happens in man himself. There is no clear evidence that 
Lao Zi is advocating some form of ontological model where things return to 
where they originated, but this fan is primarily referring to man’s own process; 
it is that he should contemplate on mutual beginning (mother), and from there 
realize the pluralist creatures (sons). It might be that there is ‘a return to the 
Mother’ when beings die, but there just isn’t a chapter in Dao De Jing that 
would state this clearly, so I’m concentrating on this inward process. 
The following chapter gives a better understanding what fan (reversion) is about 
as an inward process. Above Lao Zi advocated ‘finding the mother’, so how 
should we find this Mother, the common beginning? 
 
“Try the utmost to get the heart into complete vacuity./ Be sure to keep the mind 
in steadfast tranquility./ All things are growing and developing/ And I see 
thereby their cycles./ Though all things flourish with a myriad variations,/ Each 
one eventually returns to its roots.”168 
 
Without getting tangled in the debate of how much De Dao Jing contains 
meditative aspect, it is clear that this journey is something that a man makes in 
himself (“I see”)169. In that sense it comes close to Parmenides allegory of 
Journey. But what is the outcome of this inward process? Lao Zi continues: 
 
“He who knows eternal can embrace all./ He who embraces all can be 
impartial./ He who is impartial can be all-encompassing./ He who is all-
encompassing can be at one with Heaven./ He who is at one with Heaven can be 
at one with the Dao.”170 
 
                                               
167 Wang, p.57 
168 Wang, p.226 
169 Giving credibility to claim that this (fan) is a process that takes place inside man: chapters 10 
(Wang, p.224), 47 (p.241) and 52 (p.243) 
170 Wang, p.227 
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So to understand impartiality of the Most Fundamental Reality is to become one 
with the Dao, and this means returning to ‘the root’(ben). This returning is by no 
means a simple concept in Dao De Jing. In Returning (fan) one can find the 
following meaning171: 
 
Man returns to the root in a sense that he understands the underlying unity of 
things, the Dao and how this Dao works On the other hand, fan (reversion) also 
means that man will find his own essence (ziran, so-of-itself)172 at the root (ben). 
When he has found the ‘common origin’ he is capable of controlling the 
phenomena of a pluralistic world. 
 
“Hold on to the Dao of old,/ In order to harness present things./ From this you 
may know the primeval beginning./ This is called the law of  Dao.”173 
 
So when a man has realized Dao, he becomes to “be one with Dao”, but also he 
has capabilities to “harness present things”. In addition, when man models Dao 
(tries to work alongside with Dao), he is capable of controlling phenomena 
according to the way of Dao. 
 
“Does not the Dao of Heaven resemble the drawing of a bow?/ When the string 
is taut, press it down./ When it is low, raise it up./ When it is excessive, reduce 
it./ When it is insufficient, supplement it./ The Dao of Heaven reduces what ever 
is excessive/ And supplements whatever is insufficient.”174 
 
Dao’s work is then one of balancing the excessive. In his action man should 
model the way Dao works, but he can control phenomena in another way too:  
 
                                               
171 It could be argued that fan is used also when the emphasis is made to hold on to weakness or 
feminine as way to revitalize one. This goes in the lines of an idea that there is some cyclic 
motion that events move, from weak to strong and back to weak. But since I haven’t found any 
solid proof of this in DDJ, I’m treating fan as to refer to man’s inward journey to understand the 
Dao.  
172 Su Che, p.145, Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi 
173 Wang, p.45, ‘law’ can also be translated as ‘foundation’, see Wang, p.46 
174 Wang, p.254 
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“In order to contract it,/ It is necessary to expand it first./ In order to weaken it,/ 
It necessary to strengthen it first.”175 
 
When man understands the way Dao works, he can take advantage of this also, 
by contradicting the normal way of doing things. When one can not reduce the 
excessive, he should do the contrary and enforce things until they naturally fall 
weaker because of the law of Dao. This is to take advantage of the ‘cycles’ 
things work; from weak to strong, from strong to weak. This idea is expressed 
also in a Chinese conception of wu ji bi fan (Inevitable reversal of the 
extreme)176, where everything too excessive will naturally turn towards it’s 
opposite. 
 
While capable of controlling affairs around him, it is not that a Sage has his own 
agenda his trying to accomplish thru Dao, but that he is imitating the way Dao 
works. Idea of this lack of personal agenda is highlighted in the notion of wu-
wei. 
 
“The Dao invariably takes no action [wu-wei],/ And yet there is nothing left 
undone,/ If kings and lords are able to maintain it,/ All things will submit to 
them due to self-transformation.”177 
 
’Takes no action’ is widely used translation for wu-wei. The idea of wu-wei, 
does not mean that man shouldn’t do anything at all, but that his actions should 
not be against nature178, or the Dao. And especially, his actions shouldn’t be 
against the nature of things, but let things fulfil their own nature (De), or to put 
it another way, to help everything achieve state of ziran, so-of-itself. 
This nature (De) of each thing as it is, is referred to be calling it ziran. 
Slingerland explains ziran as:”.., Ziran refers to the way a thing is when its 
action spring from its own internal Essence.”179. So it is not that a man 
following Dao would be after his personal benefit, but he discards the irrelevant 
                                               
175 Wang, p.236 
176 Wang, p.57 
177 Wang, p.86 
178 Chan Wing-tsit: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p.135 
179 Slingerland, p.97 
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and helps beings to attain their own nature (De), and thus is part of the workings 
of the Dao. 
 
When something has achieved ziran, naturally so, it can be said to have attained 
its true nature, De. When man lets everything be, not forcing action upon them, 
he will be able to understand every beings nature, De.  
 
 
De 
 
 
In my opinion, De-part of Dao De Jing, seems to be a little bit separate from the 
rest of the material. In Guodian-slips which include the oldest fragmentary 
chapters (around 300 B.C.), concept of De doesn’t occur nearly as often as in the 
current version. Only in four chapters out of twenty-eight is de mentioned, and 
in these, only two has de in focal point. Now it could be that when the Guodian-
material reflects Confucian influences, the de-parts criticizing Confucian ideals 
are left of. Or that the de-parts of Dao De Jing came as an addition by the school 
regarding Lao Zi as their master. I’m inclined to think that the De-parts were 
written by latter Taoists, in reflection to Confucius’ thinking. The reason why I 
hold this opinion is that it is evident that Dao De Jing has been supplemented 
through its history and reflects the thinking of those that identified themselves as 
Daoists. 
 
The following interpretations for De, according to Wang Keping, stand as: 1) 
attributes of things in the physical world 2) functions of affairs in the human 
society, and 3) the virtue of a person in the course of the cultivation of his or her 
personality180. 
 
I’m not entirely happy with the clarity of that definition, but the notion of De 
that I’m inclined to use is very much on the same lines. What I’m trying to 
defend in this work, is that we incorporate notions 1) and 3), while the notion of 
De in societal affairs is not in the scope of this work.  
 
                                               
180 Wang, p.50 
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How then to incorporate these two interpretations for De? I think Mair comes 
close with his definition: “Te [De] represents self-nature or self-realization, only 
in relation to cosmos. It is in fact the actualization of the cosmic principle in the 
self. […] Each creature, each object has a te [de] which is its own manifestation 
of the Tao [Dao].”181 The following quote gives credibility to Mair’s notion of 
De: 
 
“The Dao begets all beings,/ And De fosters them./ Substance [Dao] gives them 
physical forms,/ And the environment completes them.(…)Hence the Dao begets 
all beings,/ And De fosters them, rears them and develops them,/ Matures them 
and makes them bear fruit,/ Protects them and helps them breed.”182 
 
In this chapter Lao Zi proposes his view that 1) All things have a common 
beginning, and 2) De is in charge for the way they develop. De is the 
instantiation of Dao in individual beings. De of each thing:” De is instantion of 
Dao in plural entities. It is what makes everything as it is.”183  
So De makes everything as it is and is the nature that beings are to fulfil, when 
they fulfil their De they can be regarded as ziran (naturally-so or so-of-itself) 
 
In this way the concept of Dao-De, repeats the hierarchy of wu-you. Dao as a 
unity stands higher than that of De, as manifestation in plural entities. “Only 
when is Dao lost does De arise.”184 Although this chapter deals with the ethical 
connotation of De, it can be seen that we should concentrate on Dao rather than 
on De (here personal virtue). 
 
As I see it, Dao De Jing is still stressing monistic aspect over the pluralistic 
aspect of things.  
 
 
 
                                               
181 Mair, p.135 
182 Wang, p.72-73 
183 Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi, p.21 
184 Wang, p.75-76, I have used the traditional translation for this part of the chapter, unlike 
Wang, for in my opinion it’s much more consistent with the rhythm and message of the chapter. 
 62
 
Conclusions on Lao Zi 
 
I have suggested a view on Lao Zi’s metaphysical thought that in my opinion is 
in the broad boundaries of traditional interpretation. Dao can be approached by 
two different aspects into Being; to see world as an undifferentiated One (wu, 
being-without-form/without distinctions) and as Many (you, being-within-
form/with distinctions to different objects)185.  
 
Two things should be noted. Dao can be approached as an undifferentiated One 
or as the Many. In its pluralistic aspect ‘Dao’ refers to the common beginning of 
our world (the Mother) as well to the fashion this Dao works.  
 
“Does not the Dao of Heaven resembles the drawing of a bow?/ When the string 
is taut, press it down./ When it is low, raise it up./ When it is excessive, reduce 
it./ When it is insufficient, supplement it./ The Dao of Heaven reduces what ever 
is excessive/ And supplements whatever is insufficient.”186  
 
So when Dao is used in its sense of Law that works in the world, it seems that 
its fashion is one of balancing. This of course differs from Heraclitus’ concept 
of Logos as strife. When both of these thinkers see a higher principle working in 
the world, they oppose each other on the question how this order works. If for 
Heraclitus balance in the world is maintained by two opposite forces, then for 
Lao Zi Dao itself levels the extremes. I shall continue on this topic at the end of 
my paper. 
 
The last concept that we should pay attention on Lao Zi is wu-wei. This is the 
hard core of Lao Zi’s philosophy and reflects the idea of man’s place and 
mission in the world. I let David Loy to clear the concept of wu-wei, it is non-
dual action where :”there is no bifurcation between subject and object: no 
                                               
185 Robinet sees that Dao can be approached by these two aspects,  Religious and Philosophical 
Aspects of the Laozi p.133-134 
186 Wang, p.254 
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awareness of an agent that is believed to do the actions as being distinct from an 
objective action that is done.”187 
 
In wu-wei man is a part of the world and is working alongside the Dao to bring 
everything to work according to its nature (De). As Slingerland expresses 
it:”even for Laozi, however, this wu-wei is still not to be understood as a state of 
genuine passivity, but rather represents an ideal state of harmony with the 
cosmos that brings the personal efficacy and ultimately universal salvation.”188. 
So when man has attained Dao he does not further his own agenda but is 
working alongside the Dao. 
 
I have more to say of how Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi see wisdom and 
how to attain it in the later parts of this study. Previously I noted that the De-
parts grow in number between Guodian-slips (c.300 B.C.) and Mawangdui 
material (c.200 B.C). In my opinion De-part systemizes and organizes ideas that 
are in De Dao Jing and tries to bring it to uniform description. Also the De that 
is advocated by the Dao De Jing is in juxtaposition to Confucian De189 . All this 
have lead me to believe that Dao De Jing should be regarded as a work of a 
school, identifying Lao Zi as their master. Another sign of a rich variety of 
writers, rather than a single man, is the fact that there are two concepts of wu-
you-relation; other states that wu (being-without-form) and you (being-within-
form) have the same source, other one stating that wu is the origin of you.  
 
All this editing of the Masters sayings can be applied to Heraclitus and 
Parmenides as well. Heraclitus was re-interpreted by Stoics and Parmenides by 
the Elean school of thought. We have no way of sorting out the schools 
interpretation from the original message, but must settle for what have survived 
to us of these thinkers’ work. 
 
 
 
                                               
187 Slingerland, p.73 
188 Slingerland, p.77 
189 Slingerland, p.81-82 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
I should now bring together the vast material gone through so far. My aims are 
as follows: 
 
1) To show that there are similarities between Heraclitus and Lao Zi when it 
comes to the pattern of change in the pluralistic world. Namely, there are 
parallels between the concepts held by them. For Heraclitus, the change is 
governed or has a pattern that can be called Logos. Similarly, for Lao Zi, the 
events in world exemplify the Dao, or are governed by the Dao.  
 
2) To show that there are similarities between the monism held by Parmenides 
and Lao Zi. Both of them acknowledge that Being or world can be attended via 
monistic and pluralistic aspect, but that the aspect that attends it via monistic 
route, is the more substantial one.  
 
3) To show that the differences between these three philosophers come in to 
play, when discussed about the question what kind of a Unity they see in the 
world 
 
 
1) To show that there are interesting similarities between Heraclitus and Lao Zi 
when it comes to the pattern of change in the pluralistic world. Namely, there 
are recemblances between the concepts held by each one. For Heraclitus, the 
change is governed or has a pattern that can be called Logos. Similarly, for Lao 
Zi, the events in world exemplify the Dao, or are governed by the Dao. 
 
 There indeed are some resemblances between the notion of Logos and Dao, in 
its pluralistic form, as a law of change. 
Heraclitus is in most studies considered to begin his work with a fragment 
describing the Logos  
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I) as a pattern in change. “… all things come to pass in accordance 
with this [Logos],..”190 Also we are reminded of the nature of this 
Logos 
II)  as a law of change on different occasions. “Wisdom is one thing: to 
know the will that steers all things through all.”191 This will, is of 
course, the Logos. 
       
III) We also find the law-likeness in this Logos:  
”Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city 
must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the 
laws of men are nourished by one law, the  
divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and 
is still left over.” 
192 
I showed in chapter on Heraclitus that Logos refers also to the pattern of change 
in world, and the ‘elementary theory’, is a part of the content of that Logos.  
 
We can see similar kind of descriptions of Dao, in it’s you-aspect, as a 
manifestation as order in change: 
I) As a pattern in change: “Yet it is the Dao that initiates all things/ And 
brings them to completion.”193 [lisää ch tähän? Ja ero H:n, L:n 
välissä, dao synnyttäjänä ja lakina] 
II) As a law in change: “The net of Heaven is large and vast,/ It lets 
nothing escape, despite its wide meshes.”194 
III) Dao as a law: “Hold on to the Dao of old,/ In order to harness 
present things./ From this you may know the primeval beginning./ 
This is called the law of  Dao.”195 
                                               
190 (DK.1)Kahn, p.29, I have replaced Kahn’s ’account’ with the original word, Logos, for in my 
opinion this concept is so central to Heraclitus’ thought and he uses it with so many different 
senses, which are intertwined, that it only blurs the understanding of his thought to find a fitting 
translation on every occasion. [Kahn, fr.I]  
191 Graham, p.179 
192 Kirk, p.48 
193 Wang, p.239 
194 Wang, p.253, Check also for p.159-160, that ’Heaven’ on this occasion refers to Dao as the 
way things work 
195 Wang, p.45 
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Dao and Logos are compared to Law only few times, so the connotation should 
not be over-exaggerated. Heraclitus refers to Logos as a kind of Law in only few 
fragments and Lao Zi talks about the way Dao works, without a mention of 
Active Deities. Also on III) Lao Zi is advocating the idea that if one understands 
Dao one can gain understanding ‘of the present things’, but Dao is not itself a 
law of change. What still closes its to law, is that it is impersonal, there is no 
sign of personality. The turn from active deities to impersonal ‘rule’ is evident. 
“Heaven [Dao] detests what it detests. Who knows its cause?”196 
In my opinion it’s not far-fetched to think that both of the philosophers in 
question were forcing the metaphor of law or rule over active deities. As we can 
see from the above Lao Zi quotation, there is nothing to be gained by praying or 
scarifying for this impersonal Heaven, its rule is what it is.  
 
For Heraclitus Logos described the way kosmos works. The Logos is the order 
that things come to be through, and man should understand this Logos. For Lao 
Zi “Dao begets all things, de brings them to completion.”[s.71, ch.51]. Man 
should return to Dao, here referred to as the Mother; “He who has found the 
mother,/ Thereby understands her sons;..”197 . So if Heraclitus claimed that one 
may know the true nature (physis) of things when he understands Logos, Lao Zi 
is making claims on the same lines; when you achieve Dao (mother) you will 
also understand the plural things of the world (sons).  
 
It is impossible to tell, but I doubt that Lao Zi would have serious problems with 
Heraclitus’ hen panta, but the Unity they found are different. When for 
Heraclitus the knowledge of logos gives the understanding of Unity, Lao Zi 
seems to emphasize harmony with Dao198. 
 
What are the differences between Heraclitus and Lao Zi in deeper level? Lloyd 
describes the Greek culture as antagonistic and the Chinese culture as irenic. He 
was showcasing Heraclitus as an example of this, for Heraclitus said; “War is 
                                               
196 Wang, p.253 
197 Wang, p.243 
198 Roth talks about profound merging with Dao in Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the 
Laozi, p.72 
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common because the Logos that is the law of all becoming is a law of 
strife,..”199 . And when Lao Zi talks about the Dao he is talking about the 
Mother. All this would fit Lloyd’s characterization nicely, but both of these 
philosophers use the imagery of bow when talking about the harmony on the 
Most Fundamental Reality. Even for Heraclitus regardless of the strife between 
opposite elements, there is a deeper harmony: “They do not apprehend how 
being at variance it agrees with itself: there is a connexion working in both 
directions, as in the bow or lyre.”200 
 
When Heraclitus sees that there is harmony under all the strife between 
elements, Lao Zi sees that Dao itself harmonizes, in the lines of wu ji bi fan 
(Inevitable reversal of the extreme): 
“Does not the Dao of Heaven resembles the drawing of a bow?/ When the string 
is taut, press it down./ When it is low, raise it up./ When it is excessive, reduce 
it./ When it is insufficient, supplement it./ The Dao of Heaven reduces whatever 
is excessive/ And supplements whatever is insufficient.”201 
Here we can see that Dao is one who harmonizes and this is the conduct man 
should follow. 
 
So the difference between Heraclitus and Lao Zi lies in that the other finds 
deeper harmony under the strife, and the other finds a balancing, harmonizing 
rule. 
 
Another chapter that still blurs the issue even more, is that not all the time the 
underlying forces are emphatic towards man: “Heaven and Earth are not 
humane./ They regard people as straw dogs./ The Sage is not humane./ He 
regards all people as straw dogs.202 
Straw dogs refer to straw images of dogs used as sacrificial offerings at 
ceremonies such as those worshipping Heaven or praying for rain. So we can 
conclude that even there is some sense in Lloyd’s characterization of Greek as 
antagonist and Chinese as harmony-driven, this is conclusive. 
                                               
199 (DK.80) Guthrie, p.198 
200 (DK.51), Kirk, 203 
201 Wang, p.254 
202 Wang, p.51 
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The value of these two thinkers does not lie in that Heraclitus and Lao Zi would 
have made a conclusive analysis of the pattern in change, but that they were 
among the first to come up with an impersonal concept that governs change and 
assures it’s regularity. Their concepts are nowhere near a modern day concept of 
Laws of Nature, but few strings attach these ideas, the Law is common, stable 
and truly universal. But of them hold that man should understand the way Logos 
or Dao works and then man be truly effective203, although for Lao Zi man 
should not be striving for his personal goals, as we saw in the notion of wuwei. 
 
Logos and Dao can then be something that helps one to group different 
phenomena and see the underlying unity. Logos and Dao serve as concepts 
through which both of these thinkers emphasized the unity over the plurality, the 
One over The seemingly Many. 
 
Dao has another features as well which overlap those of the logos, as we can see 
in the following when Lao Zi talks about dao in its monistic aspect. 
 
 
 
2) To show that there are similarities between the monism held by Parmenides 
and Lao Zi. Both of them acknowledge that reality can be attended via monistic 
and pluralistic aspect, but that the aspect that attends it via monistic route, is the 
more substantial one. 
 
As was shown on the Parmenides-chapter, Parmenides regarded his Way of 
Truth (Aletheia) as higher than The Way of Seeming (Doxa). The Most 
Fundamental Reality that was attended on Aletheia was monistic; “..ungenerated 
and imperishable, entire, unique, unmoved and perfect.”204  
Although Lao Zi’s description of The Most Fundamental Reality that can be 
attended via wu-aspect 
                                               
203 Kirk, p.403 
204 (DK:???), Coxon, p.60 
 69
differ in words, it is still talking about the totality in which there is no 
distinctions: “Infinite and indistinct, it cannot be named,..”205 . Lao Zi is hesitant 
to give as much description of the One as Parmenides is willing to give, to Lao 
Zi language itself makes these distinctions which can not made on the ultimate 
level. Dao is the totality of things, no part of it can be named for then there 
would be distinctions. ”The Dao that can be told is not the constant Dao./ The 
name that can be named is not the constant Name.”206 The standard 
interpretation is on the same lines with me here207, Dao as attended on wu-
aspect, as totality, can not be reached through language. There is nothing to say 
in the world where there are no distinctions made on language level, but there is 
only One which stays undescribed.   
 
The pluralistic route is investigated by Parmenides as well as Lao Zi. It is 
difficult to say how plausible Parmenides thinks his Way of Seeming (Doxa) is, 
but it is certain that it is not the level of Way of Truth (Aletheia): “Therewith I 
put a stop for you to my reliable discourse and thought about reality; from this 
point learn human beliefs, hearing the deceptive composition of my verse. 
[ doxa follows]”208  
 
Also Lao Zi’s perception was the same, his wu-aspect (being-without-form) the 
most deepest and profound way to attend the most fundamental reality:  
“Therefore it is always from the Being-without-form[Wu]/ That the subtlety of 
the Dao can be contemplated;/ Similarly it is always from the Being-within-
form[You]/ That the manifestation of Dao can be perceived./ These two have the 
same source but different names, /They both may be called deep and profound./ 
The Deepest and most profound  /Is the doorway to all subtleties.”209 
I have emphasized ‘subtlety’ and ‘subtleties’ so that reader can be convinced 
that the wu-aspect is higher than you-aspect. 
 
                                               
205 Wang, p.225 
206 Wang, p.22 
207 Bo Mou, p.430-431 
208 (DK??), Coxon, p.76 
209 Wang, p.22 
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But to turn our attention to the pluralistic accounts by Parmenides and Lao Zi, 
can one find similarities in them? In my opinion yes, but this question should get 
a study of its own. My limited account on this question goes as follows. I 
mentioned that the wu-you-relation seems to change in the Dao De Jing; in the 
what is usually regarded as the first chapter, it is mentioned that the wu and you 
‘have the same source’, but in the latter chapters it is mentioned that you (being-
within-form) comes from wu (being-without-form)210. As I explained in the Lao 
Zi-chapter, the concept of fan (reversion, return) would mean in the latter 
chapters that there is a way from plurality to monism. 
 
I think that this is what compilers and arrangers of DDJ were actually asking 
when trying to systemize the work, is there a way from pluralism to monism? If 
one would return from Many Things to the Mother, the origin of all beings, 
would it mean that one would have achieved a state where there are no 
distinctions? And in my opinion they came to the opinion that it is possible, 
albeit what the first chapter says about the subject. 
 
What about in the case of Parmenides, is there a way from pluralism to monism? 
Kouros is taken from the dark to light, and between the gates between journeys 
of night and day. This would mean that monism is somehow revealed to 
Parmenides on higher level, and Parmenides is really not holding back when he 
writes in verse to emphasize that the knowledge he has perceived stands above 
the normal knowledge . When the goddess tells about the ways of inquiry, she 
sees that the error lies in: “For they resolved to name to Forms..”211, elements 
that is and this led men to the error of considering everyday objects to be real. 
“Therefore all those things will be [nothing more than] a name, which mortals, 
confident that they are real, suppose to be coming to be and perishing, to be and 
not to be, and to change their place and alter their bright aspect to dark and 
from dark to bright.”212 
 
                                               
210 “All things under Heaven come from Being-within-form [you]. And Being-within-form comes 
from Being-without-form [wu].”, Wang, p.238 
211 (DK.8, 52), Coxon, p.76 
212 (DK.8, 38-41), Coxon, p.72-74 
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Here we can see again that for Parmenides what really is, is not subject to 
change. The Way of Seeming is not assured to carry truth, but the goddess gives 
it nevertheless for the purpose “..that never shall any mortal outstrip you in 
practical judgement.”213 Obviously ‘mortal’ should be understood as reference 
to the physiologoi, the natural philosophers for whom the changing world, 
outruled by Parmenides himself, was the main focus.  
 
I don’t see that Parmenides is of the opinion that there is a way from The Many 
to The One, route from pluralism to monism. There could be the possibility that 
when kouros is taken to the goddess, he passes ‘the gates of the journeys of 
night and day’, and so surpasses from the dualist principles to the world of 
One214, from dark to light. But none of the scholars have seen ‘the gates between 
journeys of night and day’ in this way and it unlikely that they have a relation to 
Parmenides’ Forms (elements).215 
 
So we have to conclude that for Parmenides there isn’t a straight way from the 
pluralistic aspect to the monistic aspect. Since the goddess begins her account on 
sorting out different basis for a survey on what-is, we see that these two ways 
(Aletheia and Doxa) to survey diverge from the beginning and hence we can 
safely say that they are separate aspects to what-is. These aspects reveal the 
world as the changeless world of One and the changing world of Many.  
 
These two aspects in to the world are mentioned in the beginning of Dao De 
Jing and they are on the same lines with Parmenides; we can either see world 
being-without-form (wu) which leads to monism, or being-within-form (you) 
which leads to pluralism. Later on the work this concept changes so that the 
being-without-form is the origin of being-within-form, this of course would 
                                               
213 (DK.8, 60-61), Coxon, p.78 
214 For in favor of this idea it could be thought that thinking leads man from the dark world of 
Many to the world of One: ”The mares that carry me kept conveying me as far as ever my spirit 
reached, once they had taken and set me on the goddesses’ way of much discourse, which 
carries through every stage straight onwards a man of understanding.”(DK.1, 1-4), Coxon, 
p.44 
215 Coxon thinks that the gates refers to gates of tartarus [viite] and so they have a connection to 
anticipating death [korjaa]. Of course man would gain sort of immortality, or understand that 
there is no death or birth when everything is in fact One; there is no coming-to-be or perishing-
away, hence no birth or death.  
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mean that there is a route from the pluralistic account to attending the truly 
monistic world of One. 
 
It would be interesting to compare the pluralistic accounts between Parmenides 
and Lao Zi, but Parmenides’ Doxa has not survived to our times and what is left 
of it can not be suitable basis for a deeper study. Lao Zi and Parmenides could 
have agreed that in the world of Many, one can find two forms or opposite 
forces, but in Dao De Jing the yin-yang-parity is seldom mentioned, no 
extensive analysis is made on them or is there a clear description of other 
opposite elements, unlike Parmenides’ night and day. There is however signs of 
wu ji bi fan (Inevitable reversal of the extreme) as was shown on part comparing 
Heraclitus’ Logos and Lao Zi’s Dao.  
 
If one would insist that Dao De Jing has an ontological model which uses 
elements to describe change, I would point out that this is a possibility, but few 
things should be taken in to consideration. Firstly, the chapters that would be 
pointed for finding these elements on a ontological level would be in my opinion 
chapters 25, 40 and maybe 16216. But as I went through different translations for 
these chapters I came to notice that there really isn’t convincing evidence which 
would make it certain that these chapters should be regarded as showing an 
ontological model. There are mentions on other chapters on opposite elements, 
where usually the soft and feminine are advocated. But these chapters (43, 76, 
78) deal with strategy in political-military context. Are they about ontology or 
strategy?  
 
One could say that it’s a strategy based on ontological model, i.e. man would 
imitating the workings of Dao. But I haven’t found any solid ontological model 
that would be explicated clearly. This of course doesn’t mean that there aren’t 
tendencies in DDJ which could count as general features of ontology. That is 
Dao being soft, yielding, supportive, but that there just isn’t that kind of 
                                               
216 look for Wang p. 42 for translation disagreements on ch.25. For ch.40 on Wang, p.55 and 
compare it to Mair, p.8. In my opinion Dao isn’t an ontological object moving in the world, but 
that ch.40 should be understood as advocating the right path. Ch.16 is concentrating on what one 
should look from the meditative aspect, it’s a chapter concentrating on the right way to ‘see’, not 
exhibiting ontological model. 
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element-theory on an ontological level which could make it easy to compare 
element-theories between Lao Zi and Pre-socratics. 
 
 
 
3) To show that the differences between these three philosophers come in to 
play, when discussed about the question what kind of a Unity they see to hold 
on in the world. 
 
For Heraclitus, it’s mainly epistemic monism; one rule or law governs the 
world. But it is not that the content of Logos is that of elementary-order, also all 
things, the physis (nature) of them, can be deduced from one principle, Logos. 
This is what is meant by “.., from all things one and from one all.”217 
 
For Parmenides, it is evident that he sees his work to surpass those of his 
predecessors, the natural philosophers. In my opinion, Parmenides is a monist, 
who sees that to see world as pluralistic is a misconceptions held by the 
‘mortals’. In this account what-is, is ungenerated and imperishable, entire, 
unique, unmoved and perfect. Parmenides doesn’t wholly condemn what he lays 
out in doxa, but sees that as deceptive part of goddesses verse. 
 
Lao Zi also gives stronger emphasis on what may be called his monistic view. 
But he doesn’t show any sign of contempt to a more pluralistic view, but sees 
that even in ontological plurality, there can be seen a epistemic monism, namely 
the Way in which the Dao works (the law of dao).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
217 Kahn, p.85, kirk also p.? 
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The relationship between One & The Many and change 
 
Since I have now laid out all my main points I should explicate what is the 
relationship between my key-concepts One & The Many and that of Change, 
and why they are chosen as the central point of focus. Heraclitus found the One 
in Logos; which is besides the poetic use of the word, the law which governs 
Change in the world of the Many. Parmenides is a monist, a firm believer in that 
everything is One, but goes on to give an analysis of the Change in the world of 
Many. Parmenides comes to the conclusion that to talk about Change requires 
two Forms, whose interaction creates the seemingly world of the Many. For Lao 
Zi the most fundamental reality can be seen by both routes; The One (wu) and 
The Many (you), but the on concentrating on the One is more profound. Change 
takes place in the world of The Many, where Dao can be attained as law that 
governs the Change. Dao can be attained also on the world of One, where it is 
just a name used to refer for this monistic entity.  
.  
 
Dao & Logos 
 
As said in the beginning, to compare Dao and Logos without giving an account 
of their cultural background would end in failure. But do these concepts have 
something in common? I would point out that both of them have a uniting 
feature that groups up the whole variety of phenomena under one concept. When 
one understands this concept, Dao or Logos, he is capable of understanding the 
manifold beings and their true nature (physis and de). 
 
But are the terms that refer to the nature of each thing, physis and de, really 
talking about the same thing? Is there a shared understanding what this ‘nature’ 
of each thing means? When I first started to examine and to compare Chinese 
and Greek ideas on change, I thought that I would find similarities in the 
structures these philosophers used to understand change. In other words I 
thought that the comparison could be made on the level of element theories. 
This hope came to be short-lived. 
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The whole attitude on change was different; when Lao Zi inherited the natural, 
approving attitude towards change, his counterparts in Greece were battling on 
the right arkhe (element) which could explain the nature of change. More than 
that, there comes Parmenides to say that there really is no change, or time for 
that matter.  
 
To understand really Lao Zi, Parmenides and Heraclitus, one should note that 
neither in China or in Greece was there anything close our modern concept of 
cause and effect. The real causes (Aition) were in Greece the nature (physis) of 
those things218. This would mean that they were not looking for chains of causes 
and effects to understand phenomena, but looking to the nature of each thing for 
an explanation. This of course bears the question what is common for these 
natures of different beings? For Heraclitus unity was found on Logos; the nature 
of each thing could be deduced from this Logos. Parmenides then held the 
opinion that even to divide Being into beings is a error of his predecessors and 
contemporaries. 
 
I consider it a possibility that the notes on de grew in Dao De Jing after the 
school regarding Lao Zi as their master, was confronted with those calling them 
Confucians. Confucians gave de a central place in their philosophy and 
emphasized virtue ethics, where man should cultivate his de219. To fight this 
idea Lao Zi’s heirs were advocating the idea of original, uncultivated de. For 
them the man to better himself would loose the original nature (de), and would 
be ceased to be called ziran (so-of-itself, naturally-so). 
 
There is still a difference between Lao Zi’s De and physis of Greeks. Lao Zi 
does not advocate any kind of a virtue ethics, but his message has ethical 
undertones. One should help every thing to fulfil their nature (de) and not do 
anything that is contrary to their nature. This is achieved when one has achieved 
understanding of Dao and how it works. Dao works namely in the way of wu-
                                               
218 Lloyd, p.103-104 
219 Philip J. Ivanhoe:  The Concept of de (”Virtue”) in the Laozi. 
in Religious and philosophical aspects of the Laozi (edited by Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Philip 
J. Ivanhoe), State University of New York Press, Albany, U.S.A, 1999, p.247 
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wei. This wu-wei can be translated as ‘taking-no-action’ or ‘action that is not 
against the nature of things’, the content is that man should not be striving for 
his own benefits and goals, but letting everything fulfil their nature (de). 
 
To compare physis and de would be essential in understanding the differences 
and similarities between the philosophies of ancient Greek and China. 
 
 
Wisdom 
 
I have already shown that all the three thinkers of this paper were keen to 
emphasize seeing unity under plurality, the differences lay what kind of unity 
were they after. Are there other concerns that they shared? In my opinion all of 
them were sceptical towards the knowledge perceived through senses. 
Heraclitus was sceptical towards senses, but this was only because people could 
not understand the message underlying them220 , the Logos. The knowledge of 
the Logos was to ‘understand the will that steers all things through all’ and 
understanding hen panta, all things are one.  
 
Parmenides advocated also to judge by reason and for him the most fundamental 
reality was found beyond senses. He criticized the people whom thought things 
were coming-to-be and perishing-away, but went anyway to give an account in 
the lines of his predecessors, of the changing world given by the senses. 
Lao Zi did not discard world offered by the senses, in it one could see the 
workings of the Dao taking place, but one could not find the higher level of Dao 
by mere looking:”Without going out of the door/ One may know all-under-the-
sky./ Without looking through the window/ One may know the Dao of 
                                               
220 ”Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the 
language”(DK.107), “Whatever comes from sight, hearing, learning from experience: this I 
prefer.”(DK:55), Kahn, p.106 
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Heaven.”221. The Dao is to be found inside oneself222. Its also probable that 
Heraclitus found his Logos from within:”I went in search of myself.”223 
 
As for Parmenides we can not find this ‘going to self’, but his journey could 
easily be understood as a journey that happens in himself. At least this journey is 
not taking place in the world of the mortals: “The mares that carry me kept 
conveying me as far as ever my spirit reached,..”224.  
 
As noted before, all these philosophers in question seemed to use rather 
suggestive language, in order to make the reader ponder the things himself.  
Heraclitus’ message was obscure on purpose, Lao Zi offers no proof for his 
philosophical considerations and Parmenides talks about his Aletheia as way of 
persuasion. To me this means that they did not defend their philosophies by 
referring to active deities, even though they still used these metaphorically, but 
were genuinely laying their work for an open assessment. 
 
It is also interesting why Parmenides and Lao Zi chose to link their wisdom to 
feminine virtues. Lao Zi talks about Dao as mother and emphasizes that its 
nature is that of a nurturer. Parmenides’ goddess reflects the purest wisdom and 
her ways are that of persuasion. It is useful to know that some of the phrases in 
Dao refers to femininity in a very concrete way225. 
 
 
The world of philosophy today 
 
Why should these ancient philosophies be regarded by modern philosophy? First 
of all, there is popular conception that philosophy started with Plato and 
Aristotle. It is an old concept that Plato was trying to combine Heraclitus’ 
                                               
221 Wang, p.122 
222 ”Block up the holes;/ Shut up the doors;/ And till the end of life there wil be no toil.”, see 
Wang p.122-124 on Lao Zi’s relation to senses. 
223 (DK.101), Kahn, p.41. See also Kahn p.21, where he states that its probable that Heraclitus 
found the law in the microcosm and then in the macrocosm. 
224 Coxon, p.44, I have emphasized the ’spirit’. 
225 xuan pin (The subtle and profound female) used to describe the nature of Dao, refers to 
female sex organ in its concrete sense, see Wang, p.39-40 
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change and Parmenides’ stability226. But in order to understand the importance 
of Logos for modern philosophy, one should understand how influential it has 
been.   
 
There is a influental book which starts with the Logos: “In the beginning there 
was Logos and that Logos was God.”227 The church-fathers, founders and editors 
of Christian faith were also influenced by the idea of Logos. For them individual 
Logos should reflect thoroughly the original Logos, God. So what lays in the 
western tradition, is the central concept of what is the goal of human existence; 
to know the Logos. For what started as the natural philosophers project and was 
later to become as the scientific approach, concentrated to the question what is 
the pattern of this constant change, the Logos] And likewise, for church-fathers 
it was essential that man’s mind reflects the true reality, the Logos, the God. 
What ties these two approaches together is, that man’s mind should reflect the 
true reality. This stands as well for Heraclitus, Parmenides, church fathers, and 
even today’s physicists community, when it is trying to find the laws behind the 
changing world228. In my opinion studying Heraclitus and Parmenides would 
clarify the concept of representational so influential in western history.  
Maybe the natural philosophers would be tempted to ask from the physicists, 
why are these regularities, laws holding? 
 
I began this work by citing a poem that is quotes by people that have the opinion 
that East and West are incompatible by nature and there can be no genuine 
understanding between them.  
 
 
Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the two shall meet,  
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat; 
  
                                               
226 Long, p.17 
227 The Gospel of John 
228 It could be argued that the early Wittgenstein continues an essentially heraclitean project; 
Wittgenstein sees that we should give an account (logos) of the true structure (logos) of the 
world. Heidegger was interested in pre-Socratics and was also involved in translating Lao Zi to 
German. See Lin Ma: ”Deciphering Heidegger’s Connection with the Daodejing”, Asian 
Philosophy, 16:3, 149-171 (Asian Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 3, November 2006) 
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What I hope I have shown is that on the philosophical level there is shared, 
common ground when we take notice of the differences in the cultural 
background. The author of the aforementioned poem, Rudyard Kipling, did not 
however feel the way that is usually considered by those that quote his poem. He 
ends his poem in universal tone that I wish this work in its own part could 
promote. 
 
 
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,         95
When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they come from the ends of 
the earth.  
-Rudyard Kipling: The Ballad of East and West 
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